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Abstract. Constraints and quantitative preferences, or costs, are very useful for
modelling many real-life problems. However, in many settings, it is difficult to
specify precise preference values, and it is much more reasonable to allow for
preference intervals. We define several notions of optimal solutions for such prob-
lems, providing algorithms to find optimal solutions and also to test whether a
solution is optimal. Most of the time these algorithms just require the solution
of soft constraint problems, which suggests that it may be possible to handle this
form of uncertainty in soft constraints without significantly increasing the com-
putational effort needed to reason with such problems. This is supported also by
experimental results. We also identify classes of problems where the same results
hold if users are allowed to use multiple disjoint intervals rather than a single one.
1 Introduction
Constraints [11] are useful to model real-life problems when it is clear what should be
accepted and what should be forbidden. Soft constraints [9] extend the constraint notion
by allowing several levels of acceptance. This allows to express preferences and/or costs
rather than just strict requirements.
In soft constraints, each instantiation of the variables of a constraint must be associ-
ated to a precise preference or cost value. Sometimes it is not possible for a user to know
exactly all these values. For example, a user may have a vague idea of the preference
value, or may not be willing to reveal his preference, for example for privacy reasons.
In this paper we consider these forms of imprecision, and we handle them by ex-
tending soft constraints to allow users to state an interval of preference values for each
instantiation of the variables of a constraint. This interval can contain a single element
(in this case we have usual soft constraints), or the whole range of preference values
(when there is complete ignorance about the preference value), or it may contain more
than one element but a strict subset of the set of preference values. We call such prob-
lems interval-valued soft CSPs (or also IVSCSPs).
In an elicitation procedure there will typically be some degree of imprecision, so
attributing an interval rather than a precise preference degree can be a more reliable
model of the information elicited. Also, linguistic descriptions of degrees of preference
(such as ”quite high” or ”low” or ”undesirable”) may be more naturally mapped to pref-
erence intervals, especially if the preferences are being elicited from different experts,
as they may mean somewhat different things by these terms.
Two examples of real world application domains where preference intervals can
be useful or necessary are energy trading and network traffic analysis [15], where the
data information is usually incomplete or erroneous. In energy trading, costs may be
imprecise because they may evolve due to market changes; in network traffic analysis,
the overwhelming amount of information and measurement difficulties force the use
of partial or imprecise information. Many other application domains that are usually
modelled via hard or soft constraints could benefit by increased expressed power of
preference intervals. To give a concrete example in this paper we consider the meeting
scheduling problem, that is a typical benchmark for CSPs, and we allow the specifica-
tion of preference intervals. This benchmark will be used both to clarify notions related
to IVCSPs and to run experimental tests.
Given an IVSCSP, we consider several notions of optimal solutions. We first start
with general notions of optimality, which apply whenever we have several scenarios to
consider. For example, as done in [7], we consider necessarily optimal solutions, which
are optimal in all scenarios, or possibly optimal solutions, which are optimal in at least
one scenario. We then pass to interval-based optimality notions, that define optimality
in terms of the upper and lower bounds of the intervals associated to the solution by the
constraints.
Since IVSCSPs generalize soft constraint problems, the problem of finding an opti-
mal solution in an IVSCP (according to any of the considered optimality notions) is at
least as difficult as finding an optimal solution in a soft constraint problem ans thus it is
NP-hard.
We provide algorithms to find solutions according to all the notions defined, and
also to test whether a given solution is optimal. In most of the cases, finding or test-
ing an optimal solution amounts to solving a soft constraint problem. Thus, even if our
formalism significantly extends soft constraints, and gives users much more power in
modelling their knowledge of the real world, in the end the work needed to find an op-
timal solution (or to test if it is optimal) is not more than that needed to find an optimal
solution in a soft constraint problem. This claim is supported by the experimental re-
sults we present, obtained by extensive tests over instances of the meeting scheduling
problem.
We also show that for some classes of IVSCSPs the optimality notions considered
in this paper would not produce different results if users were allowed to use multiple
disjoint intervals rather than a single one. This means that a level of precision greater
than a single interval does not add any useful information when looking for an optimal
solution.
Previous approaches to uncertainty in soft constraint problems assumed either a
complete knowledge of the preference value, or a complete ignorance. In other words,
a preference value in a domain or a constraint was either present or not [4, 6, 8, 14].
Then, the solver was trying to find optimal solutions with the information given by the
user or via some form of elicitation of additional preference values. Here instead we
consider a more general setting where the user may specify preference intervals. Also,
we assume that the user has given us all the information he has about the problem, so we
do not resort to preference elicitation (or the elicitation phase is over with the user being
unable or unwilling to give us more precise information). Moreover, previous work
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looks only for necessarily optimal solutions, and uses preference elicitation, if needed,
to find them. Here instead we consider many other notions of optimal solutions, with
the aim of returning interesting solutions without resorting to preference elicitation.
Another work that analyzes the impact of the uncertainty in soft constraint problems
is shown in [10]. However, while we assume to have only preference intervals, in [10]
it is assumed that all the preferences are given and some of them are tagged as possibly
unstable and are provided with a range, of possible variations, around their value.
Other papers consider preference intervals, such as the work in [3]. However, these
lines of work focus on specific preference aggregation mechanisms (such as the Cho-
quet integral) and of modelling issues without addressing the algorithmic questions
related to finding optimal solutions according to different risk attitudes. We are instead
interested in providing efficient algorithms to find optimal solutions according to differ-
ent risk attitudes (called pessimistic and optimistic in the paper), besides the modelling
concerns.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall the main definitions for
soft constraints and in Section 3 we introduce interval-valued soft constraint problems.
In Section 4 we give general notions of optimal solutions, which apply whenever we
have several scenarios to consider, while in Section 5 we introduce interval-based op-
timality notions. In Sections 6 and 7 we present algorithms to find solutions according
to optimality notions defined. Then, in Section 8 we introduce notions of dominance
between solutions, we show how they are related to the notions of optimality, and we
describe how to test dominance. In Section 9 we analyze the impact of having multiple
preference intervals. In Section 10 we present an experimental study of the algorithms
to find optimal solutions. Finally, in Section 11 we give some final considerations and
we propose some hints for future work.
2 Background: soft constraints
In the literature there are many formalizations of the concept of soft constraints [5, 12].
Here we refer to the one described in [1, 5], which however can be shown to generalize
and express many others [2].
A soft constraint [1] is just a classical constraint where each instantiation of its vari-
ables has an associated value from a (totally or partially ordered) set, which is called
a c-semiring. More precisely, a c-semiring is a tuple 〈A,+,×,0,1〉 such that: A is
a set, called the carrier of the c-semiring, and 0,1 ∈ A; + is commutative, associa-
tive, idempotent, 0 is its unit element, and 1 is its absorbing element; × is associative,
commutative, distributes over +, 1 is its unit element and 0 is its absorbing element.
Consider the relation≤S over A such that a ≤S b iff a+ b = b.≤S is a partial order; +
and × are monotone on ≤S; 0 is its minimum and 1 its maximum; 〈A,≤S〉 is a lattice
and, for all a, b ∈ A, a + b = lub(a, b). Moreover, if × is idempotent, then 〈A,≤S〉
is a distributive lattice and × is its glb. The relation ≤S gives us a way to compare
preference values: when a ≤S b, we say that b is better than a. Element 0 is the worst
value and 1 is the best one.
A c-semiring 〈A,+,×,0,1〉 is said to be idempotent when the combination oper-
ator × is idempotent, while it is said to be strictly monotonic when the combination
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operator × is strictly monotonic. If a c-semiring is totally ordered, i.e., if ≤S is a to-
tal order, then the + operation is just max with respect to ≤S. If the c-semiring is also
idempotent, then× is equal to min, and the c-semiring is of the kind used for fuzzy con-
straints (see below). Notice that there are also c-semirings that are neither idempotent
nor strictly monotonic.
Given a c-semiring S = 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, a finite set D (the domain of the variables),
and an ordered set of variables V , a soft constraint is a pair 〈def, con〉 where con ⊆ V
and def : D|con| → A. Therefore, a soft constraint specifies a set of variables (the
ones in con), and assigns to each tuple of values of D of these variables an element of
the c-semiring set A, which will be seen as its preference. A soft constraint satisfaction
problem (SCSP) is just a set of soft constraints over a set of variables.
A classical CSP is just an SCSP where the chosen c-semiring is SCSP = 〈{false,
true},∨,∧, false, true〉. Fuzzy CSPs are instead modeled by choosing the idempotent
c-semiring SFCSP = 〈[0, 1], max,min, 0, 1〉: we want to maximize the minimum
preference. For weighted CSPs, the strictly monotonic c-semiring is SWCSP = 〈ℜ+,
min,+, +∞, 0〉: preferences are interpreted as costs from 0 to +∞, and we want to
minimize the sum of costs.
Given an assignment s to all the variables of an SCSP Q, that is, a solution of Q,
its preference, written pref(Q, s), is obtained by combining the preferences associated
by each constraint to the subtuples of s referring to the variables of the constraint:
pref(Q, s) = Π〈idef,con〉∈C def(s↓con), where Π refers to the × operation of the c-
semiring and s↓con is the projection of tuple s on the variables in con. For example, in
fuzzy CSPs, the preference of a complete assignment is the minimum preference given
by the constraints. In weighted constraints, it is instead the sum of the costs given by
the constraints. An optimal solution of an SCSP Q is then a complete assignment s
such that there is no other complete assignment s′′ with pref(Q, s) <S pref(Q, s′′).
We denote with Opt(Q) the set of all optimal solutions of an SCSP Q and with Sol(Q)
the set of all the solutions of an SCSP Q.
Given an SCSP Q defined over an idempotent c-semiring, and a preference α, we
will denote as cutα(Q) (resp., scutα(Q)) the CSP obtained fromQ allowing only tuples
with preference greater than or equal to α (resp., strictly greater than α). It is known
that the set of solutions of Q with preference greater than or equal to α(resp., strictly
greater than α) coincides with the set of solutions of cutα(Q) (resp., scutα(Q)).
3 Interval-valued soft constraints
Soft constraint problems require users to specify a preference value for each tuple in
each constraint. Sometimes this is not reasonable, because a user may have a vague
idea of what preferences to associate to some tuples. In [6] a first generalization allowed
users to specify either a fixed preference (as in usual soft constraints) or the complete
[0,1] interval. Thus an assumption of complete ignorance was made when the user was
not able to specify a fixed preference. Here we generalize further by allowing users to
state any interval over the preference set.
Definition 1 (interval-valued soft constraint). Given a set of variables V with finite
domain D and a totally-ordered c-semiring S = 〈A,+,×,0,1〉, an interval-valued
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soft constraint is a pair 〈int, con〉 where con ⊆ V is the scope of the constraint and
int:D|con| −→ A×A specifies an interval over A by giving its lower and upper bound.
If int(x) = (a, b), it must be a ≤S b.
In the following we will denote with l(int(x)) (resp., u(int(x))) the first (resp.,
second) component of int(x), representing the lower and the upper bound of the pref-
erence interval.
Definition 2 (IVSCSP). An interval-valued soft constraint problem (IVSCSP) is a 4-
tuple 〈V,D,C, S〉, where C is a set of interval-valued soft constraints over S defined
on the variables in V with domain D.
Figure 1 shows an IVSCSP P defined over the fuzzy c-semiring 〈[0, 1],max,min,
0, 1〉, that contains three variables X1, X2, and X3, with domain {a, b}, and five con-
straints: a unary constraint on each variable, and two binary constraints on (x1, x2) and
(x2, x3).
Fig. 1. An IVSCSP over fuzzy semiring.
In an IVSCSP, a complete assignment of values to all the variables can be associated
to an interval as well. The lower bound (resp., the upper bound) of such an interval is
obtained by combining all the lower bounds (resp., the upper bounds) of the preference
intervals of the appropriate subtuples of this assignment in the various constraints.
Definition 3 (preference interval). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉 and an as-
signment s to all its variables over D, the preference interval of s in P is [L(s), U(s)],
where L(s) = Π<int,con>∈Cl(int( s↓con)) and U(s) = Π<int,con>∈Cu(int(s↓con)),
and Π is the combination operator of the c-semiring S.
Figure 2 shows all the complete assignments of the IVSCSP in Figure 1, together
with their preference interval and the computation details for s1.
Fig. 2. Solutions of the IVSCSP shown in Figure 1.
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Once we have an IVSCSP, it is useful to consider specific scenarios arising from
choosing a preference value from each interval.
Definition 4 (scenario). Given an IVSCSP P , a scenario of P is an SCSP P ′ ob-
tained from P as follows: given any constraint c = 〈int, con〉 of P , we insert in P ′
the constraint c′ = 〈def, con〉, where def(t) ∈ [l(int(t)), u(int(t))] for every tuple
t ∈ D|con|.
We will denote with Sc(P ) the set of all possible scenarios of P .
Definition 5 (best and worst scenario). Given an IVSCSPP , the best scenario (bs(P ))
(resp., the worst scenario (ws(P ))) of P is the scenario obtained by replacing every
interval with its upper (resp., lower) bound.
We will denote with lopt and uopt the optimal preferences of the worst and best scenario.
The preference interval of a complete assignment is a good way of representing the
quality of the solution in all scenarios, as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider an IVSCSP P over a c-semiring S and a complete assignment
s of its variables. Then, for all Q ∈ Sc(P ), pref(Q, s) ∈ [L(s), U(s)]. Also, for p ∈
{L(s), U(s)}, there exists a Q ∈ Sc(P ) such that p = pref(Q, s). If the c-semiring
S is idempotent, then for all p ∈ [L(s), U(s)], there exists a Q ∈ Sc(P ) such that
p = pref(Q, s).
Proof: pref(Q, s) ∈ [L(s), U(s)] follows by monotonicity. If p = L(s) (resp., p =
U(s)), it is possible to build a scenario where p = pref(Q, s), by fixing all the tuples
of s to their lower bound (resp., to their upper bound). If the c-semiring is idempotent,
since we are considering totally ordered c-semirings, the operator × is minimum (with
respect to the total order), so there exists some interval-valued constraint 〈int, con〉 in
P such that l(int(s↓con)) = L(s). We must also have u(int(s↓con)) ≥ U(s). Let p be
an element of [L(s), U(s)]. Define a scenario Q by replacing this interval-valued con-
straint with any soft constraint which assigns the tuple s↓con the preference value p, and
replacing any of the other elements of P with soft constraints which assign preference
value U(s) to the appropriate projection of s. We then have p = pref(Q, s). 2
This means that, in general, the upper and lower bounds of the solution preference
interval always model preferences of solutions in some scenarios. In the idempotent
case we have more: the whole interval, and not just the bounds, represents all and only
the preferences coming from the scenarios. Intuitively, if × is idempotent (let us con-
sider min for simplicity): given an assignment s, for every element x in [L(s), U(s)],
we can construct a scenario where s has preference x by fixing preference x on at least
one tuple (that has x in its interval) and by fixing all other preferences of tuples in s to
their upper bound.
4 Necessary and possible optimality
We will now consider general notions of optimality, that are applicable to any setting
where the lack of precision gives rise to several possible scenarios. First we define op-
timal solutions that guarantee optimality in some or all scenarios (i.e., the possibly and
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the necessarily optimal solutions [6]), and then we will define solutions that guarantee
a certain level of preference in some or all scenarios.
Definition 6 (necessarily optimal). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉 and an as-
signment s to the variables in V , s is necessarily optimal iff it is optimal in all scenar-
ios.
Given an IVSCSP P , the set of its necessarily optimal solutions will be denoted
by NO(P ). Necessarily optimal solutions are very attractive because they are very
robust: they are optimal independently of the uncertainty of the problem. Unfortunately,
NO(P ) may be empty, as in the IVSCSP P of Figure 1.
Definition 7 (possibly optimal). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉 and an assign-
ment s to the variables in V , s is possibly optimal iff it is optimal in some scenario.
Given an IVSCSP P , the set of possibly optimal solutions of P will be denoted by
PO(P ). In the IVSCSP P of Figure 1 we have PO(P ) = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s6}. PO(P )
is never empty. However, the possibly optimal solutions are less attractive than the nec-
essarily optimal ones, in fact they guarantee optimality only for a specific completion
of the uncertainty.
We assume now to want to guarantee a certain level of preference in some or all the
scenarios.
Definition 8 (necessarily of at least preferenceα). Given an IVSCSPP = 〈V,D,C, S〉
and an assignment s to the variables in V , s is necessarily of at least preference α iff,
for all scenarios, its preference is at least α.
The set of all solutions of an IVSCSP P with this feature will be denoted by
Nec(P, α). In our running example, if we consider α = 0.5, we have Nec(P, 0.5) =
{s1, s2, s4, s6}. If α is a satisfactory preference level, elements in Nec(P, α) are ideal,
because they guarantee such a preference level independently of the uncertainty of the
problem.
Definition 9 (possibly of at least preference α). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉
and an assignment s to the variables in V , s is possibly of at least preference α iff, for
some scenario, its preference is at least α.
The set of all solutions of an IVSCSP P with this feature will be denoted by
Pos(P, α). In the IVSCSP P of Figure 1, if we take α = 0.3, we have Pos(P, 0.3) =
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s6, s7}.
5 Interval-based optimality notions
In an IVSCSP, uncertainty is specified via the preference intervals. Depending on how
one decides to deal with this form of uncertainty, different notions of optimality can be
given. Here we will consider interval-based optimality notions, and we will relate them
to the necessarily and possibly optimal solutions.
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5.1 Interval-dominant assignments
In the attempt to characterize the necessarily optimal solutions, we can consider the
following notion.
Definition 10 (interval-dominant). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉 and an as-
signment s to the variables in V , s is interval-dominant iff, for every other complete
assignment s′, L(s) ≥ U(s′).
Interval-dominant assignments are better than or equal to all others in all scenarios,
and thus are very robust w.r.t. uncertainty. We denote with ID(P ) the set of the interval
dominant assignments of P . The IVSCSP P of Figure 1 has ID(P ) = ∅.
Proposition 1. If ID(P ) 6= ∅, either ID(P ) contains a single solution, or all the so-
lutions in ID(P ) have their lower bound equal to their upper bound, and all these
bounds are equal to the same value. Given an IVSCSP P , ID(P ) may be empty.
Proof: ID(P ) may be empty as in the IVSCSP P of Figure 1.
We now show, by contradiction, that if ID(P ) 6= ∅, either ID(P ) contains a single
solution, or several solutions all with the lower bound equal to the upper bound, and all
equal to the same value. If ID(P ) contains two solutions, say s1 and s2, with different
values of lower and upper bounds, then L(s1) < U(s1) andL(s2) < U(s2). Since s1 ∈
ID(P ), then for any other solution s′, L(s1) ≥ U(s′) and thus also L(s1) ≥ U(s2).
Similarly, since s2 ∈ ID(P ), then for any other solution s′, L(s2) ≥ U(s′) and thus
L(s2) ≥ U(s1). Therefore, L(s1) ≥ U(s2) > L(s2) ≥ U(s1) and so L(s1) > U(s1),
that is a contradiction. 2
It is possible to show that the interval-dominant optimality notion is stronger than
the necessary optimality notion. More precisely:
Proposition 2. Given an IVSCSPP , we have that ID(P ) ⊆ NO(P ). Also, if ID(P ) 6=
∅, then ID(P ) = NO(P ).
Proof: We first show that ID(P ) ⊆ NO(P ). If a solution is in ID(P ), its preference
is always greater than or equal to the upper bounds of all the other solutions, hence it is
optimal in all the scenarios.
We now prove that, if ID(P ) 6= ∅, then ID(P ) = NO(P ). We have already shown
that ID(P ) ⊆ NO(P ). It remains to prove that NO(P ) ⊆ ID(P ). Let us denote with
s∗ a solution of ID(P ). If a solution s of P is not in ID(P ) and ID(P ) 6= ∅, then s is
not in NO(P ). In fact, if L(s∗) 6= U(s∗), then U(s∗) > L(s∗) ≥ U(s), and so s is not
optimal in the best scenario. If L(s∗) = U(s∗), since s 6∈ ID(P ), L(s) < L(s∗) and
so s is not optimal in the worst scenario. 2
5.2 Weakly-interval-dominant assignments
A more relaxed interval-based optimality notion is the following one.
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Definition 11 (weakly-interval-dominant). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉 and
an assignment s to the variables in V , s is weakly-interval-dominant iff, for every other
complete assignment s′, L(s) ≥ L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′).
Weakly-interval-dominant assignments are better than or equal to all others in both
the worst and the best scenario. We denote with WID(P ) the set of the weakly interval
dominant assignments of P . The IVSCSP P of Figure 1 has WID(P ) = {s1}.
Proposition 3. Given an IVSCSP P , WID(P ) may be empty. Moreover, ID(P ) ⊆
WID(P ).
Proof: WID(P ) may be empty. For example, one can construct an IVSCSP over
fuzzy c-semiring with only three solutions, say s1, s2, and s3, with the following lower
and upper bounds:L(s1) = 0.2,U(s1) = 0.6,L(s2) = 0.3,U(s2) = 0.8,L(s3) = 0.4,
and U(s3) = 0.7.
We now show that ID(P ) ⊆ WID(P ). If s ∈ ID(P ), then L(s) ≥ U(s′) for
every other s′. Hence, since U(s) ≥ L(s) and U(s′) ≥ L(s′) for every other s′, we
have U(s) ≥ L(s) ≥ U(s′) ≥ L(s′) for every other s′, that is, U(s) ≥ U(s′) and
L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every other s′, hence s ∈WID(P ). 2
The weakly-interval-dominant optimality notion is weaker than the necessary opti-
mality notion. In fact, NO(P ) ⊆WID(P ) and for some IVSCSP P (for example, the
IVSCSP of Figure 1) this inclusion is strict. More precisely:
Proposition 4. Given an IVSCSP P , we have that ID(P ) ⊆ NO(P ) ⊆WID(P ).
Proof: By Proposition 2, we know that ID(P ) ⊆ NO(P ).
We now show that NO(P ) ⊆WID(P ). If s ∈ NO(P ), then s must be optimal in
every scenario and so also in the best and in the worst scenario. Given that s is optimal
in the worst scenario, then L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every other solution s′. Moreover, as s is
optimal in the best scenario, then U(s) ≥ U(s′) for every other solution s′. Therefore,
L(s) ≥ L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′) for every other solution s′. This allows us to conclude
that s ∈ WID(P ). 2
Since ID(P ) ⊆ NO(P ) ⊆WID(P ), ID(P ) and WID(P ) can be seen as lower
and upper approximations of NO(P ).
5.3 Lower and upper optimal assignments
Until now we have considered how to characterize, via interval-based optimality no-
tions, the necessarily optimal solutions. In particular, we have found lower and upper
approximations of these optimal solutions. We now move to consider possibly optimal
solutions via new interval-based optimality notions.
Definition 12 (lower and upper optimal). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉 and
an assignment s to the variables in V , s is lower-optimal (resp., upper-optimal) iff, for
every other complete assignment s′, L(s) ≥ L(s′) (resp., U(s) ≥ U(s′)).
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A lower-optimal (resp., an upper-optimal) assignment is better than or equal to all
other complete assignments in the worst scenario (resp., in the best scenario). Lower-
optimal (resp., upper-optimal) assignments are useful in pessimistic (resp., optimistic)
approaches to uncertainty, because they outperform the other assignments in the worst
(resp., in the best) case. We denote with LO(P ) (resp., UO(P )) the set of the lower
(resp., upper) optimal assignments of P . The IVSCSP P of Figure 1 has LO(P ) =
{s1, s4} and UO(P ) = {s1, s2}.
Lower and upper optimal solutions are never empty. Moreover, they are related to
weakly-interval-dominant and interval-dominant solutions as follows.
Proposition 5. Given an IVSCSP P , and the optimal preference lopt (resp., uopt) of
ws(P ) (resp., bs(P )),
– LO(P ) and UO(P ) are never empty;
– UO(P ) ∩ LO(P ) = WID(P );
– if lopt = uopt, then ID(P ) = LO(P );
– if lopt < uopt, and |UO(P )| ≥ 2, then ID(P ) = ∅;
– if |UO(P )| = 1, let us call s this single solution. If L(s) 6= lopt then ID(P ) = ∅.
Proof: LO(P ) is never empty because it is always possible to find the solutions with
the lower bound greater than or equal to all the other solutions. A similar argument
shows that UO(P ) is never empty.
We now show that UO(P ) ∩ LO(P ) = WID(P ). We first show that UO(P ) ∩
LO(P ) ⊆WID(P ). If s ∈ UO(P ) ∩ LO(P ), then, by definition of UO(P ), U(s) ≥
U(s′) for every other s′ and, by definition of LO(P ), L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every other
s′, therefore s ∈ WID(P ). We now show that WID(P ) ⊆ UO(P ) ∩ LO(P ). If
s ∈ WID(P ), by definition of WID(P ), U(s) ≥ U(s′) and L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every
other s′, hence both s ∈ LO(P ) and s ∈ UO(P ), therefore s ∈ LO(P ) ∩ UO(P ).
To show that, if lopt = uopt, then ID(P ) = LO(P ), it is sufficient to show that
lopt = uopt implies LO(P ) ⊆ ID(P ), as ID(P ) ⊆ LO(P ) follows from Theorem 2.
In fact, if s ∈ ID(P ), then s ∈ Opt(ws(P )) and thus, by Theorem 2, s ∈ LO(P ).
If s ∈ LO(P ) then L(s) = lopt. Moreover, since lopt = uopt, L(s) = uopt, and so
L(s) ≥ U(s′), for every other solution s′, that is s ∈ ID(P ).
We now prove, by contradiction, that, if lopt < uopt and |UO(P )| ≥ 2, then
ID(P ) = ∅. Suppose ID(P ) 6= ∅. Let us denote with s one of the solutions of
ID(P ). Then, by definition of ID(P ), L(s) ≥ U(s′), for every other solution s′. Since
|UO(P )| ≥ 2, we are sure that there is a solution s′′ 6= s such that U(s′′) = uopt.
Hence, L(s) ≥ U(s′′) = uopt > lopt, and so L(s) > lopt, that is a contradiction, be-
cause, by the definition of lopt, lopt is greater than or equal to the lower bound of every
solution.
Assume that |UO(P )| = 1 and let us call s this single solution. We now show, by
contradiction, that, if L(s) 6= lopt, then ID(P ) = ∅. Let us denote with s1 one of the
solutions with L(s1) = lopt. Suppose that ID(P ) 6= ∅, and let s′ be an element of
ID(P ). If s′ 6= s then U(s′) ≥ L(s′) ≥ U(s), which implies that s′ ∈ UO(P ), a
contradiction. Hence s′ = s. But then s′ 6= s1, so L(s′) ≥ U(s1) ≥ L(s1) = lopt,
which contradicts L(s) 6= lopt. 2
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As every lower (resp., upper) optimal solution is optimal in the worst (resp. best)
scenario, then LO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ), UO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ), and these inclusions may be
strict, because there may be solutions that are optimal only in scenarios that are different
from the best and the worst scenario.
Proposition 6. Given an IVSCSP P , we have that LO(P ) ∪ UO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ).
Proof: Let s be a complete assignment to the variables of P .
LO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ). In fact, if s ∈ LO(P ), then s is optimal in the worst scenario
and so s ∈ PO(P ).
UO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ). In fact, if s ∈ UO(P ), then s is optimal in the best scenario
and so s ∈ PO(P ).
Therefore, LO(P ) ∪ UO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ). 2
Therefore, the lower and upper optimality notions are stronger than the possible
optimality notion.
The lower and upper optimal assignments are also related to the necessarily and
possibly of at least preference α assignments as follows.
Proposition 7. Given an IVSCSP P and the optimal preference lopt of ws(P ),
– Nec(P, α) 6= ∅ iff α ≤ lopt;
– if α ≤ lopt, LO(P ) ⊆ Nec(P, α);
– let α∗ be the maximum α such that there exists a solution in Nec(P, α), then α∗ =
lopt and Nec(P, α∗) = LO(P ), and so Nec(P, α∗) ⊆ PO(P ).
Proof: Let us show the first item of the theorem. To show that Nec(P, α) 6= ∅ iff
α ≤ lopt, we first prove that, if Nec(P, α) 6= ∅, then α ≤ lopt. If Nec(P, α) 6= ∅, then
there is a solution, say s, such that pref(Qi, s) ≥ α for every scenario Qi of P and so
also for the worst scenario. Hence, lopt ≥ pref(ws(P ), s) ≥ α. Therefore, lopt ≥ α.
We now show that, if α ≤ lopt, then Nec(P, α) 6= ∅. If Nec(P, α) = ∅, then for every
solution s we have that pref(Qi, s) < α for some scenario Qi. This holds also for any
solution, say s∗, such that pref(ws(P ), s∗) = lopt, and so lopt = pref(ws(P ), s∗) < α.
We now show the second item of the theorem: givenα ≤ lopt,LO(P ) ⊆ Nec(P, α).
If LO(P ) 6⊆ Nec(P, α), then there is a solution, say s, such that s ∈ LO(P ) \
Nec(P, α). Since s ∈ LO(P ), pref(ws(P ), s) = lopt. Since s 6∈ Nec(P, α), then
pref(Qi, s) < α for some scenario Qi, and so, as ws(P ) is the worst scenario, lopt =
pref(ws(P ), s) ≤ pref(Qi, s) < α. Therefore, lopt < α.
We now show, by contradiction, that α∗ = lopt. If α∗ > lopt, then, by the previous
part of the proof, Nec(P, α∗) = ∅, that is a contradiction because α∗ is the maximum
α such that Nec(P, α) 6= ∅. If α∗ < lopt, then α∗ is not the maximum α such that
Nec(P, α) 6= ∅, since such a value is lopt, and so we have a contradiction.
We now prove that, if α∗ = lopt, then Nec(P, α∗) = LO(P ). Let s be a com-
plete assignment to the variables of P . If s ∈ Nec(P, lopt), then for every scenario Q,
pref(Q, s) ≥ lopt and so also for the worst scenario. Therefore, as lopt is the optimal
preference of the worst scenario, s ∈ LO(P ). If s ∈ LO(P ), then pref(ws(P ), s) =
lopt. Since for every scenario Q, pref(Q, s) ≥ pref(ws(P ), s) = lopt, then s ∈
Nec(P, lopt).
11
Since Nec(P, α∗) = LO(P ) and since, by Proposition 6, LO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ), then
Nec(P, α∗) ⊆ PO(P ). 2
Thus, in general,Nec(P, α) is not empty only if α is at most the optimal preference
of the worst scenario, and in such a case every lower-optimal solution is in Nec(P, α).
Moreover, if we consider a particular value of α, also the converse holds. Therefore, in
this case the necessarily of at least preference α solutions are lower-optimal solutions
and thus they are possibly optimal solutions.
Moreover, a solution is in Pos(P, α) only if α is at most the optimal preference
of the best scenario, and in such a case, for a particular value of α, the possibly of at
least preference α solutions coincide with the upper optimal solutions, and thus they
are possibly optimal solutions.
Proposition 8. Given an IVSCSP P and an assignment s to the variables of P ,
– s is in Pos(P, α) if and only if α ≤ U(s);
– let α∗ be the maximum α such that Pos(P, α) is not empty, then Pos(P, α∗) =
UO(P ), and so Pos(P, α∗) ⊆ PO(P ).
Proof: We first show that s is in Pos(P, α) if and only if α ≤ U(s). If s ∈ Pos(P, α),
then there is a scenario where pref(Q, s) ≥ α. By Theorem 1, we know that U(s) is
the highest preference associated to s in any scenario, then U(s) ≥ pref(Q, s) and so
U(s) ≥ α. If α ≤ U(s), then, by Theorem 1, there is a scenario Q, where pref(Q, s) =
U(s). Since U(s) ≥ α, then s ∈ Pos(P, α).
We now show that Pos(P, α∗) = UO(P ). If s ∈ Pos(P, α∗), then there is a sce-
nario Q where pref(Q, s) ≥ α∗. Since α∗ is the maximum α such that Pos(P, α) 6= ∅,
then, α∗ = uopt, where uopt is the optimal preference in the best scenario. Hence,
s ∈ UO(P ). If s ∈ UO(P ), then pref(Q, s) = uopt, hence in the best scenario
pref(bs(P ), s) = uopt and thus s ∈ Pos(P, α∗), where α∗ = uopt.
Since by Proposition 6, UO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ), then Pos(P, α∗) ⊆ PO(P ). 2
5.4 Lower and upper lexicographically-optimal assignments
We now introduce two optimality notions that refine the lower and upper optimal no-
tions.
Definition 13 (Lower and upper lexicographically-optimal). Given an IVSCSP P =
〈V,D,C, S〉 and an assignment s to the variables in V , s is lower (resp., upper)
lexicographically-optimal iff, for every other complete assignment s′, either L(s) >
L(s′) (resp., U(s) > U(s′)), or L(s) = L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′) (resp., U(s) = U(s′)
and L(s) ≥ L(s′)).
Lower (resp., upper) lexicographically-optimal assignments are those optimal as-
signments of the worst scenario (resp., best scenario) that are the best ones in the best
scenario (resp., in the worst scenario). We denote with LLO(P ) (resp., ULO(P )) the
set of the lower (resp., upper) lexicographically-optimal assignments of P . The IVSCSP
P of Figure 1 has LLO(P ) = ULO(P ) = {s1}.
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Proposition 9. Given an IVSCSP P ,
– LLO(P ) ⊆ LO(P ) and so LLO(P ) is never empty;
– ULO(P ) ⊆ UO(P ) and so ULO(P ) is never empty;
– ID(P ) ⊆ (LLO(P ) ∩ ULO(P )) = WID(P ).
Proof: We show that LLO(P ) ⊆ LO(P ). The relation ULO(P ) ⊆ UO(P ) can be
shown similarly. If s ∈ LLO(P ), then, by definition of LLO(P ), L(s) > L(s′) or
(L(s) = L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′)) for every other s′, hence L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every
other s′ and so s ∈ LO(P ).
Since LLO(P ) is contained in LO(P ) and, by Proposition 5, LO(P ) is never
empty, then LLO(P ) is never empty. Similarly, it is possible to show that ULO(P )
is never empty.
We now prove that (LLO(P )∩ULO(P )) = WID(P ). We first show that (LLO(P )
∩ULO(P )) ⊆WID(P ). If s ∈ (LLO(P )∩ULO(P )), then, by definition ofLLO(P ),
L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every other s′ and, by definition of ULO(P ), U(s) ≥ U(s′) for every
other s′, hence s ∈WID(P ). We now show that WID(P ) ⊆ (LLO(P )∩ULO(P )).
If s ∈ WID(P ), then, by definition of WID(P ), L(s) ≥ L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′)
for every other s′. It could happen that (L(s) > L(s′) and U(s) > U(s′)) or (L(s) >
L(s′) and U(s) = U(s′)) or (L(s) = L(s′) and U(s) > U(s′)) or (L(s) = L(s′)
and U(s) = U(s′)) for every other s′. If L(s) > L(s′) and U(s) > U(s′) for ev-
ery other s′, then s ∈ LLO(P ) ∩ ULO(P ) by the first part of the definitions of
LLO(P ) and ULO(P ). If L(s) > L(s′) and U(s) = U(s′) for every other s′ , then
s ∈ LLO(P ) ∩ ULO(P ) by the first part of the definition of LLO(P ) and by the
second part of the definition of ULO(P ). If L(s) = L(s′) and U(s) > U(s′) for every
other s′, then s ∈ LLO(P )∩ULO(P ) by the second part of the definition of LLO(P )
and by the first part of the definition of ULO(P ). If L(s) = L(s′) and U(s) = U(s′)
for every other s′, then s ∈ LLO(P ) ∩ ULO(P ) by the second part of the definitions
of LLO(P ) and ULO(P ). 2
Since lower and upper lexicographically-optimal solutions are refinements of lower
and upper optimal solutions, they are possibly optimal solutions as well. However, the
converse does not hold in general.
Proposition 10. Given an IVSCSP P , (LLO(P ) ∪ ULO(P )) ⊆ PO(P ).
Proof: We know, by Proposition 9, that LLO(P ) ⊆ LO(P ) and ULO(P ) ⊆ UO(P ).
Since, by Proposition 6, LO(P ) and UO(P ) are contained PO(P ), then also LLO(P )
and ULO(P ) are contained in PO(P ). 2
5.5 Interval-optimal assignments
Until now we have considered optimality notions that are stronger than the possibly
optimal notion. In the attempt to fully characterize possibly optimal solutions, we now
consider an interval-based optimality notion that is weaker than the lower and upper
optimality notions.
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Definition 14 (interval-optimal). Given an IVSCSP P = 〈V,D,C, S〉 and an assign-
ment s to the variables in V , s is defined to be interval-optimal iff, for every other
complete assignment s′, L(s) ≥ L(s′) or U(s) ≥ U(s′).
An interval-optimal assignment is a complete assignment with either a higher or
equal lower bound, or a higher or equal upper bound, w.r.t. all other assignments. This
means that, for every other complete assignment, it must be better than, or equal to it
in either the worst or the best scenario. We denote with IO(P ) the set of the interval
optimal assignments of P . The IVSCSP P of Figure 1 has IO(P ) = {s1, s2, s4}.
Proposition 11. Given an IVSCSP P , (UO(P ) ∪ LO(P )) ⊆ IO(P ) and so IO(P ) is
never empty.
Proof: Let s be a complete assignment to the variables of P . Suppose that s ∈ UO(P )∪
LO(P ). There are two cases, (i) s ∈ UO(P ), and (ii) s ∈ LO(P ). Suppose (i) that s ∈
UO(P ). ThenU(s) ≥ U(s′) for every other complete assignment s′ and so s ∈ IO(P ).
Similarly, (ii) if s ∈ LO(P ) then L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every other s′, hence s ∈ IO(P ).
Since (UO(P )∪LO(P )) ⊆ IO(P ) and, by Proposition 5, LO(P ) and UO(P ) are
never empty, then IO(P ) is never empty. 2
The interval-optimal solutions are possibly optimal solutions, but the converse does
not hold in general, as shown in the following proposition. Therefore, also the interval-
optimality notion is stronger than the possible optimality notion.
Proposition 12. Given an IVSCSP P , if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic or idem-
potent, then IO(P ) ⊆ PO(P ). Moreover, PO(P ) 6⊆ IO(P ).
Proof: Let s be a complete assignment to the variables of P .
Let us consider a strictly monotonic c-semiring. We know, by Theorem 10, that
s ∈ PO(P ) iff s ∈ Opt(Qs), where Qs is the scenario where all the preferences of
tuples in s are set to their upper bound and all other tuples are associated to the lower
bound of their preferences. We now show that, if s ∈ IO, then s ∈ Opt(Qs) and so, by
Theorem 10, s ∈ PO(P ). Assume that s 6∈ Opt(Qs), we will show that s 6∈ IO(P ). If
s 6∈ Opt(Qs), then there is a solution s′ such that pref(Qs, s′) > pref(Qs, s).
– If s has no tuples in common with s′, then, by construction of Qs, pref(Qs, s′) =
L(s′) and pref(Qs, s) = U(s). Since pref(Qs, s′) > pref(Qs, s), and for every
solution its lower bound is lower than or equal to its upper bound, then U(s′) ≥
L(s′) > U(s) ≥ L(s) and so U(s′) > U(s) and L(s′) > L(s), that implies that
s 6∈ IO(P ).
– If s has some tuple in common with s′, then, pref(Qs, s′) = λ×u, and pref(Qs, s) =
µ × u, where λ (resp., µ) is the combination of the preferences of the tuples that
are in s′ but not in s (resp., in s but not in s′), and u is the combination of the
preferences of the tuples that are both in s and in s′. By hypothesis, pref(Qs, s′) >
pref(Qs, s), i.e., λ × u > µ × u. By construction of Qs, U(s′) ≥ λ × u >
µ × u = U(s), and so U(s′) > U(s). Moreover, since the combination opera-
tor is monotonic, if λ × u > µ × u, then λ > µ. In fact, if λ ≤ µ, by mono-
tonicity, λ × u ≤ µ × u. Let us denote with u′ (resp., µ′) the combination of
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the lower bounds of the preferences of the tuples that are both in s and in s′
(resp., in s but not in s′). Then, by strict monotonicity and by construction of Qs,
L(s′) = λ × u′ > µ × u′ ≥ µ′ × u′ = L(s), and so L(s′) > L(s). Therefore, if
s has some tuple in common with s′, then U(s′) > U(s) and L(s′) > L(s), i.e.,
s 6∈ IO(P ).
Let us now consider an idempotent c-semiring. We want to show that if s ∈ IO(P ),
then s ∈ PO(P ). We will show that, if s ∈ IO(P ), then s ∈ Opt(Q∗), where Q∗
is the scenario such that all the preferences of the tuples of s are set to U(s), if U(s)
is contained in their preference interval, and to their upper bound, if U(s) is not con-
tained in their preference interval, and all other tuples are associated to the lower bound
of their preferences. First, we show that pref(Q∗, s) = U(s). Then, we show that
pref(Q∗, s) ≥ pref(Q∗, s′), for every other solution s′ that has no tuples in common
with s and for every solution s′ that has some tuple in common with s.
– pref(Q∗, s) = U(s), by construction of Q∗, by Theorem 1 and by idempotency. In
fact, by Theorem 1, pref(Q∗, s) ≤ U(s). Moreover, pref(Q∗, s) 6< U(s). In fact,
we now show that pref(Q∗, s) is given by the combination of the preferences that
are all greater than or equal to U(s). By construction of Q∗ we have two results.
(1) Every tuple of s in Q∗ with preference interval that contains U(s) is assigned
to U(s) and, by definition of U(s) and by idempotency, there must be at least one
of these preferences. (2) Every tuple with preference interval that does not contain
U(s) is assigned to its upper bound that must be a value greater thanU(s), since, by
definition ofU(s), the upper bound of every tuple of s must be greater than or equal
to U(s), otherwise the upper bound of s is not U(s) but a value lower than U(s),
that is a contradiction. Therefore, pref(Q∗, s) 6< U(s) and so pref(Q∗, s) = U(s).
– If s has no tuples in common with s′, then, by construction of Q∗, pref(Q∗, s′) =
L(s′) and pref(Q∗, s) = U(s). Since s ∈ IO(P ), then L(s) ≥ L(s′) or U(s) ≥
U(s′). If L(s) ≥ L(s′), then pref(Q∗, s) = U(s) ≥ L(s) ≥ L(s′) = pref(Q∗, s′).
If U(s) ≥ U(s′), then pref(Q∗, s) = U(s) ≥ U(s′) ≥ L(s′) = pref(Q∗, s′).
– If s has some tuple in common with s′, then, by construction of Q∗ pref(Q∗, s′) ≤
U(s) = pref(Q∗, s).
Therefore, for every solution s′, pref(Q∗, s′) ≤ U(s) = pref(Q∗, s). Hence, s is
optimal in Q∗ and so s ∈ PO(P ).
PO(P ) 6⊆ IO(P ). In fact, assume to have an IVSCSP over a fuzzy c-semiring,
where there is only one variable x with three values in its domain, say x1, x2, and x3,
with preference intervals respectively [0.4, 0.6], [0.5, 0.7], and [0.5, 0.8]. Then, x1 6∈
IO(P ), becauseL(x1) < L(x2) andU(x1) < U(x2). However,x1 ∈ PO(P ), because
x1 is optimal in the scenario where we associate to x1 the value 0.6 and to x2 and x3
the value 0.5.
2
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5.6 Summary of the various notions of optimality and of their relations
The various notions of optimality defined above are summarized in Table 1. For each
notion, we refer to a solution s and we describe compactly when s belongs to each of
the optimality sets.
Table 1. Optimality notions.
Optimality notions Definition
NO(P ) s ∈ Opt(Q), ∀Q ∈ Sc(P )
PO(P ) s ∈ Opt(Q), ∃Q ∈ Sc(P )
Nec(P, α) pref(Q, s) ≥ α, ∀Q ∈ Sc(P )
Pos(P, α) pref(Q, s) ≥ α, ∃Q ∈ Sc(P )
ID(P ) L(s) ≥ U(s′), ∀s′ ∈ Sol(P )
WID(P ) L(s) ≥ L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′), ∀s′ ∈ Sol(P )
LO(P ) L(s) ≥ L(s′), ∀s′ ∈ Sol(P )
UO(P ) U(s) ≥ U(s′), ∀s′ ∈ Sol(P )
LLO(P ) L(s) > L(s′) or (L(s) = L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′)), ∀s′ ∈ Sol(P )
ULO(P ) U(s) > U(s′) or (U(s) = U(s′) and L(s) ≥ L(s′)), ∀s′ ∈ Sol(P )
IO(P ) L(s) ≥ L(s′) or U(s) ≥ U(s′), ∀s′ ∈ Sol(P )
The set-based relations between the various optimality notions are described in Fig-
ure 3.
Fig. 3. Relation among optimality sets.
5.7 An example: meeting scheduling problems
To better explain how to use the various optimality notions introduced in the previous
sections, we consider an example of a class of problems, related to meeting scheduling.
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The meeting scheduling problem is a benchmark for CSPs [13], and we have adapted it
to allow also for preference intervals.
A meeting scheduling problem (MSP) is informally the problem of scheduling some
meetings by allowing the participants to attend all the meetings they are involved in.
More formally, a MSP can be described by
– a set of agents;
– a set of meetings, each with a location and a duration;
– a set of time slots where meetings can take place;
– for each meeting, a subset of agents that are supposed to attend such a meeting;
– for each pair of locations, the time to go from one location to the other one.
Typical simplifying assumptions concern having the same duration for all meetings
(one time slot), and the same number of meeting for each agent. To solve a MSP, we
need to allocate each meeting in a time slot in a way that each agent can participate
in his meetings. The only way that an agent cannot participate has to do with the time
needed to go from the location of a meeting to the location of his next meeting.
The MSP can be easily seen as a CSP: variables represent meetings and variable
domains represent all time slots. Each constraint between two meetings model the fact
that one or more agents must participate in both meetings, and it is satisfied by all pairs
of time slots that allow the participation to both meetings according to the time needed
to pass between the corresponding locations. For this reason, it is often used as a typical
benchmark for CSPs.
For our purposes, we consider a generalization of the MSP, called IVMSP, where
there is a chair, who is in charge of the meeting scheduling, and who declares his pref-
erences over the variable domains and over the compatible pairs of time slots in the
binary constraints. The preferences over the variable domains can model the fact that
the chair prefers some time slots to others for a certain meeting. On the other hand, the
preferences in the binary constraints can model a preference for certain feasible pairs
of time slots, over others, for the two meetings involved in the constraint.
Such preferences can be exact values when the chair works with complete informa-
tion. However, at the time the meeting scheduling has to be done, it may be that some
information, useful for deciding the preferences, is still missing. For example, the chair
could have invited agents to meetings, but he does not yet know who will accept his in-
vitations. As other examples, weather considerations or the presence of other events in
the same time slots may affect the preferences. Because of this uncertainty, some pref-
erences may be expressed by using an interval of values, which includes all preference
values that are associated to all possible outcomes of the uncertain events.
Since MSPs can be expressed as CSPs, it is thus clear that IVMSPs can be expressed
as IVSCSPs. The problem of solving an IVMSP concerns finding time slots for the
meetings such that all agents can participate and, among all possible solutions, to choose
an optimal one according to some optimality criteria. We will now consider several of
the optimality notions defined above and describe their use in this class of problems.
In this context, given an IVMSP P , necessarily optimal solutions (i.e., solutions
in NO(P )) are meeting schedulings that are optimal no matter how the uncertainty is
resolved. Thus, if there is at least one of such solutions, this is certainly preferred to any
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other. By working with the optimality notions defined over intervals, to find a solution
in NO(P ), we may try to find a solution in ID(P ), given that solutions in ID(P ), if
any, coincide with solutions in NO(P ). Otherwise, if ID(P ) is empty, and given that
NO(P ) is included in WID(P ), we may look for a solution in WID(P ). We recall
that solutions in ID(P ) are meeting schedulings where the preference interval of the
optimal solution is above the preference intervals of all other solutions, while solutions
in WID(P ) have the upper bound of their preference interval above the upper bounds
of the preference intervals of all other solutions, and the same for the lower bound.
Solutions in Nec(P, α∗) are also attractive, because they guarantee a preference
level of α∗ in all scenarios. Since LO = Nec(P, α∗), we may find a solution in LO(P ),
that is, a solution which is optimal in the worst scenario. This solution will guarantee
the chair against the uncertainty of the problem by assuring a certain level of overall
preference. This notion can be useful if the chair is pessimistic, because such solutions
provide a preference guarantee over all scenarios. However, such a guaranteed prefer-
ence level may be very low.
If instead the chair is optimistic, he may ask for a solution in Pos(P, α∗), that
is, a solution with the highest preference level in some scenario. Since UO(P ) =
Pos(P, α∗), we may find a solution in UO(P ), that is, a solution which is optimal
in the best scenario.
When looking for solutions in LO(P ) and UO(P ), we may want to be as close as
possible to solutions in NO(P ), as NO(P ) is included in LO(P ) and UO(P ). To do
this, we can try to find solutions in LLO(P ) or ULO(P ), respectively. For example,
solutions in LLO(P ) are solutions in LO(P ) that have the highest upper bound of their
preference interval. This means that, depending on how the uncertainty is resolved, they
give more hope of achieving a higher level of preference.
6 Finding and testing interval-based optimal assignments
In this section we analyze how to determine if a complete assignment is one of the
different kinds of optimal assignments previously defined in Section 5, and how to find
such optimal assignments. These results will be useful to find and test possibly and
necessarily optimal solutions.
6.1 Lower and upper optimal assignments
It is easy to show that, by following directly the definitions of lower and upper opti-
mal assignments, the lower (resp., upper) optimal solutions coincide with the optimal
elements of the worst (resp., best) scenario.
Theorem 2. Given an IVSCSPP ,LO(P ) = Opt(ws(P )) andUO(P ) = Opt(bs(P )).
Proof: We show that LO(P ) = Opt(ws(P )). Let s be a solution of P . If s ∈ LO(P ),
then L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every other solution s′, hence if we consider ws(P ), i.e., the
worst scenario of P , that is the scenario where we fix all the preference intervals to their
lower bound, then pref(ws(P ), s) = L(s) and so pref(ws(P ), s) ≥ pref(ws(P ), s′)
for every other solution s′, hence s ∈ Opt(ws(P )). If s ∈ Opt(ws(P )), then pref(ws(P ),
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s) ≥ pref(ws(P ), s′) for every other solution s′ of P , that is, by definition of worst
scenario, L(s) ≥ L(s′) for every s′ and so s ∈ LO(P ). Similarly, it is possible to show
that UO(P ) = Opt(bs(P )). 2
A lower-optimal solution is a complete assignment whose lower bound is greater
than or equal to the lower bound of every other complete assignment. Thus, it is a
complete assignment that is better than or equal to all other assignments in the scenario
obtained by replacing every interval with its lower bound, i.e., the worst scenario.
Thus, finding a lower-optimal (resp. upper-optimal) solution is as complex as solv-
ing an SCSP. This holds also for testing if an assignment s is in LO(P ) (resp. in
UO(P )), since it is enough to solve the SCSP representing the worst or the best sce-
nario and to check if the preference of the optimal solution coincides with L(s) (resp.
U(s)).
6.2 Interval optimal assignments
To find an interval optimal assignment, it is sufficient to find a lower-optimal solution or
an upper-optimal solution, because (UO(P ) ∪LO(P )) ⊆ IO(P ), and neither UO(P )
nor LO(P ) can be empty. Thus, finding assignments of IO(P ) can be achieved by
solving an SCSP.
To test if a solution is interval optimal, if the c-semiring is idempotent, we can
exploit the preference levels of the best and worst scenarios, as stated by the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Given an IVSCSP P defined over an idempotent c-semiring, and an as-
signment s, we have s ∈ IO(P ) iff the CSP obtained by joining1 scutL(s)(ws(P )) and
scutU(s)(bs(P )) has no solution.
Proof: Let us denote withQ the CSP defined in the theorem. We first show that, ifQ has
no solution, then s ∈ IO(P ). Suppose that s /∈ IO(P ). Then there exists some com-
plete assignment s′ with L(s′) > L(s) and U(s′) > U(s). Then pref(ws(P ), s′) =
L(s′) > L(s) and pref(bs(P ), s′) = U(s′) > U(s), so s′ is a solution of Q. We now
show that, if s ∈ IO(P ), then Q has no solution. If Q has a solution, say s∗, then, by
definition of Q, L(s∗) > L(s) and U(s∗) > U(s), and so s 6∈ IO(P ). 2
In fact, all and only the solutions of such a CSP strictly dominate s with respect
to both the lower and the upper bound. Thus, testing membership in IO(P ) when the
semiring is idempotent amounts to solving a CSP.
More generally (that is, even if the combination operator is not idempotent), we
can test interval optimality by checking if a suitably defined SCSP has solutions with
preference above certain threshold.
Theorem 4. Given an IVSCSP P and an assignment s, let lopt and uopt be the op-
timal preferences of the worst and best scenario. Then, s ∈ IO(P ) iff at least one
1 The join of two CSPs P1 and P2 is the CSP whose set of variables (resp., constraints) is given
by the union of the sets of variables (resp., constraints) of P1 and P2.
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of the following conditions holds: (1) L(s) = lopt; (2) U(s) = uopt; (3) the SCSP
Q with the same variables, domains, and constraint topology as P , defined on the c-
semiring 〈(A × A), (+,+), (×,×), (0,0), (1,1)〉, where the preference of each tuple
in each constraint is set to the pair containing the lower and upper bound of its inter-
val in P , has no solution s′ with preference pair (L(s′), U(s′)) pointwise greater than
(L(s), U(s)), i.e., such that L(s′) > L(s) and U(s′) > U(s).
Proof: We first show that if L(s) = lopt, U(s) = uopt, or Q has no solution with
preference greater than (L(s), U(s)), then s ∈ IO(P ). If L(s) = lopt (resp., U(s) =
uopt), then L(s) ≥ L(s′) (resp., U(s) > U(s′)) for every other solution s′, hence
s ∈ LO(P ) (resp., s ∈ UO(P )) and so, since LO(P )∪UO(P ) ⊆ IO(P ), s ∈ IO(P ).
If Q has no solution with preference greater than (L(s), U(s)), then s ∈ IO(P ). In
fact, if s 6∈ IO(P ), then there is a solution, say s∗, such that L(s∗) > L(s) and
U(s∗) > U(s), and so Q has a solution with preference greater than (L(s), U(s)).
We now show, that if s ∈ IO(P ), then L(s) = lopt, U(s) = uopt, or Q has no
solution with preference greater than (L(s), U(s)). If L(s) 6= lopt, U(s) 6= uopt and
Q has a solution s∗ with preference greater than (L(s), U(s)), then, by definition of Q,
the preference of (L(s∗), U(s∗)) is greater than the preference of (L(s), U(s)), hence
L(s∗) > L(s) and U(s∗) > U(s) and so s 6∈ IO(P ). 2
The first two conditions simply check if s is either lower or upper optimal. The
second condition is satisfied when there is no solution better than s on both bounds.
Notice that this can be checked for example by running branch and bound on Q with a
strict bound equal to (L(s), U(s)). Therefore, testing membership in IO(P ) with any
c-semiring can be achieved by solving at most three SCSPs.
6.3 Lower and upper lexicographically optimal assignments
To find the lower-lexicographically optimal solutions of an IVSCSP P we consider the
optimal solutions of a suitable SCSP, as described by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Given an IVSCSP P over a strictly monotonic c-semiring S, let us con-
sider the SCSP Q with the same variables, domains, and constraint topology as P , and
defined over the c-semiring 〈A × A,maxlex, (×,×), (0,0), (1,1)〉. The binary oper-
ation maxlex is defined to be the maximum with respect to the ordering lex defined
as follows: for each (a, a′), (b, b′) ∈ (A × A), (a, a′) lex (b, b′) iff a >S b or a = b
and a′ ≥S b′. For each tuple in each constraint of Q, its preference is set to the pair
containing the lower and upper bound of its interval in P . Then, LLO(P ) = Opt(Q).
Proof: We first show that LLO(P ) ⊆ Opt(Q). If s ∈ LLO(P ), then s ∈ Opt(Q).
In fact, if s 6∈ Opt(Q), then, there is a solution, say s′, of Q such that pref(Q, s′) >
pref(Q, s), that is, by definition of preference given in the theorem, (L(s′), U(s′)) ≻lex
(L(s), U(s)), that is, by definition of ≻lex, either L(s′) > L(s) or (L(s′) = L(s) and
U(s′) > U(s)), and so s 6∈ LLO(P ).
We now show that Opt(Q) ⊆ LLO(P ). If s ∈ Opt(Q), then pref(Q, s′) ≥
pref(Q, s), for every s′, that is, (L(s′), U(s′)) lex (L(s), U(s)), for every other s′,
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that is, for every other s′, either L(s′) > L(s) or (L(s′) = L(s) and U(s′) ≥ U(s)),
and so s ∈ LLO(P ).
Note that the assumption of strict monotonicity of S guarantees that the structure
defined in the theorem 〈A × A,maxlex, (×,×), (0,0), (1,1)〉 is a c-semiring. If we
don’t make this assumption, then distributivity property does not hold and so the struc-
ture above is not a c-semiring. 2
In words, the first component of the pairs in the semiring of Theorem 5 is the most
important, and the second one is used to break ties. To find the upper-lexicographically
optimal solutions, it is sufficient to consider the same SCSP as defined above except
for the ordering which considers the second component as the most important. Thus,
finding assignments in LLO(P ) and ULO(P ) can be achieved by solving one SCSP.
To test if a solution s is in LLO(P ), it is enough to find the preference pair, say
(p1, p2), of an optimal solution of the SCSP defined above and to check if (L(s), U(s)) =
(p1, p2). Similarly to test if a solution is in ULO(P ).
6.4 Weakly interval dominant assignments
We know that WID(P ) = LO(P ) ∩ UO(P ). Thus a straightforward, but costly, way
to find a solution in WID(P ) is to compute all the optimal solutions of the best and
the worst scenario and to check if there is a solution in the intersection of the two
sets. However, if the c-semiring is idempotent, this is not necessary, as shown by the
following theorem.
Theorem 6. Given an IVSCSP P defined over an idempotent c-semiring, and lopt and
uopt as defined above, an assignment s is in WID(P ) iff it is a solution of the CSP
obtained by joining cutlopt(ws(P )) and cutuopt(bs(P )).
Proof: Let us denote with Q the CSP described in the theorem. We first show that, if s
is a solution of Q, then s ∈WID(P ). If s is a solution of Q, then, by definition of Q, s
is a solution of the CSP cutlopt(ws(P )) obtained from the worst scenario by allowing
only the tuples with preference greater than or equal to lopt, hence, by definition of
lopt, L(s) ≥ L(s
′) for every other solution s′. Moreover, by definition of Q, s is also
a solution of the CSP cutuopt(bs(P )) obtained from the best scenario by allowing only
the tuples with preferences greater than or equal to uopt. Hence, by the definition of
uopt, U(s) ≥ U(s′), for every other s′. Therefore, if s is a solution of Q, then L(s) ≥
L(s′) and U(s) ≥ U(s′) for every other s′, and so s ∈WID(P ).
We now show that, if s ∈ WID(P ), then s is a solution of Q. If s is not a solution
of Q, then L(s) < lopt or U(s) < uopt. If L(s) < lopt (resp., U(s) < uopt), then
L(s) < L(s′) (resp., U(s) < U(s′)) for any solution s′ such that pref(ws(P ), s′) =
lopt (resp., pref(bs(P ), s′) = uopt). Therefore, s 6∈ WID(P ). 2
In words, any solution of the join CSP is optimal both in the worst and in the best
scenario and this implies that it is undominated on both bounds. Thus, if the c-semiring
is idempotent, finding a weakly interval dominant solution amounts to solving two SC-
SPs and one CSP. Moreover, to test whether a solution s is in WID(P ), it is sufficient
to check if L(s) = lopt and U(s) = uopt, which amounts to solving two SCSPs.
21
6.5 Interval dominant assignments
To find an assignment in ID(P ), we can use Proposition 5. Thus, if lopt = uopt, then it
is sufficient to find a lower-optimal solution. If instead lopt < uopt then, if |UO(P )| ≥
2, then we know that ID(P ) = ∅. Moreover, if |UO(P )| = 1 (let us call s this single
solution), if L(s) 6= lopt then we know that ID(P ) = ∅.
If the c-semiring is idempotent, cuts can be exploited in the same style as above,
to build a suitably defined CSP, leading to a sound and complete procedure to find an
assignment, if any, in ID(P ).
Theorem 7. Given an IVSCSP P over an idempotent c-semiring, and lopt as defined
above, if scutlopt(bs(P )) has no solution, then ID(P ) = LO(P ). If scutlopt(bs(P ))
has one solution, say s, and L(s) = lopt, then this solution is the only one in ID(P ).
Otherwise, ID(P ) = ∅.
Proof: Let us denote with Q the CSP scutlopt(bs(P )). We first show that if Q has
no solution, then ID(P ) = LO(P ). If Q has no solution, then, since Q is the CSP
obtained by the best scenario by allowing only tuples with preference greater than lopt,
there is no solution with upper bound greater than lopt, that is, for all the solutions
s′ of P , lopt ≥ U(s′). To show that ID(P ) = LO(P ) it is sufficient to show that
LO(P ) ⊆ ID(P ), since Theorem 2 implies that ID(P ) ⊆ LO(P ). Let s be a solution
of P . If s ∈ LO(P ), then L(s) = lopt and thus, by the reasoning above, L(s) ≥ U(s′)
for every other s′, hence s ∈ ID(P ).
If Q has a solution, say s, then U(s) > lopt ≥ L(s′) for all solutions s′, and so
ID(P ) is either empty or equal to {s}. Therefore if Q has more than one solution
then ID(P ) is empty. Suppose that Q has exactly one solution, s. If L(s) < lopt then
L(s) < L(s′) for any solution s′ with L(s′) = lopt, and so L(s) < U(s′), which im-
plies that s /∈ ID(P ) and so ID(P ) = ∅. If L(s) = lopt then for any other solution
s′ we have U(s′) ≤ lopt (since Q has only one solution), and so L(s) ≥ U(s′) which
implies that s ∈ ID(P ) and so ID(P ) = {s}. 2
Performing a strict cut of the best scenario at the optimal level of the worst sce-
nario means isolating solutions that have an upper bound higher than lopt. If there is no
such solution, then the upper bound of the lower-optimal solutions must coincide with
their lower bound (lopt). Thus, lower-optimal solutions coincide with interval dominant
solutions. If, instead, such a CSP has only one solution, all other solutions must have
an upper bound which is at most lopt. This means that, if this solution is also lower-
optimal, then it is the only interval dominant solution. Finally, if there is more than one
solution with an upper bound above lopt, then there cannot be any solution whose lower
bound dominates the upper bound of all others and, thus, ID(P ) is empty.
Summarizing, when the c-semiring is idempotent, to find a solution in ID(P ) we
need to solve an SCSP and then one CSP. Proposition 5 and Theorem 7 can also be used
to test if a solution is interval dominant.
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7 Finding and testing necessarily optimal and possibly optimal
assignments
We will now show how to test if an assignment is possibly or necessarily optimal (or
of at least preference α) and how to find these kinds of assignments. To do that, we
will exploit the relation between possibly and necessarily optimal assignments and the
various kinds of interval-based optimal assignments, shown in Section 5.
7.1 Necessarily optimal solutions
To find a necessarily optimal solution, we exploit the results shown in Propositions
2 and 4 (i.e., if ID(P ) 6= ∅ then NO(P ) = ID(P ), and ID(P ) ⊆ NO(P ) ⊆
WID(P )), and thus we perform the following steps:
1. If ID(P ) 6= ∅, then return s ∈ ID(P );
2. If WID(P ) = ∅, then NO(P ) = ∅;
3. Otherwise, return the first solution in WID(P ) that is necessarily optimal. If none,
NO(P ) = ∅
Testing if a solution is necessarily optimal when ID(P ) 6= ∅ coincides with testing
if it is in ID(P ). Otherwise, we need to test if it is an optimal solution of some suitably
defined SCSPs, as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Consider an IVSCSP P and an assignments s. Let Qs (resp., Qs) be the
scenario where every preference associated to a tuple of s is set to its lower bound
(resp., upper bound) and the preferences of all other tuples are set to their upper bound
(resp., lower bound). The following results hold:
– If s ∈ NO(P ), then s ∈ Opt(Qs). Moreover, if the c-semiring is strictly mono-
tonic, the converse holds as well: s ∈ NO(P ) ⇐⇒ s ∈ Opt(Qs).
– If s ∈ NO(P ) then, for every s′, s ∈ Opt(Qs′). If the c-semiring is idempotent,
the converse holds as well: s ∈ NO(P ) ⇐⇒ for every s′, s ∈ Opt(Qs′).
Proof: We first show that, if s ∈ NO(P ), then s ∈ Opt(Qs). If s ∈ NO(P ), then it is
optimal in all scenarios and so also in Qs.
We now show that, if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic and if s ∈ Opt(Qs), then
s ∈ NO(P ). If s ∈ Opt(Qs), then pref(Qs, s) ≥ pref(Qs, s′) for every other solution
s′. For every other s′, let λ (resp., µ) be the combination of the preference values of
tuples associated to s but not to s′ (resp., associated to s′ but not to s) in Qs, and let
u be the combination of the preference values of tuples associated to both s and s′ in
Qs. Since, for every s′, pref(Qs, s) ≥ pref(Qs, s′), then for every s′, λ × u ≥ µ × u
that implies that λ ≥ µ. In fact, if λ < µ, then, by strict monotonicity of ×, then
λ×u < µ×u. For every scenario Qi, for every s′, let λi (resp., µi) be the combination
of the preference values of tuples associated to s′ but not to s (resp., associated to s′
but not to s) in Qi and let ui be the combination of the preference values of tuples
associated to both s and s′ in Qi. Since Qs is the least favorable scenario for s, then for
every scenario Qi, λi×u ≥ λ×u that implies λi ≥ λ. In fact, if λi < λ, then, by strict
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monotonicity, λi × u < λ × u. Since Qs is the most favorable scenario for the tuples
in s′ but not in s, then µ ≥ µi for every scenario Qi. Therefore, for every scenario
Qi, for every s′, we have that λ ≥ µ, λi ≥ λ and µ ≥ µi, hence, by monotonicity,
pref(Qi, s) = λi×ui ≥ λ×ui ≥ µ×ui ≥ µi×ui = pref(Qi, s′), hence s is optimal
in every scenario and so s ∈ NO(P ).
If s ∈ NO(P ), then s is optimal in all the scenarios and so, for every s′, s is op-
timal in Qs′ . If the c-semiring is idempotent and, for every s′, s ∈ Opt(Qs′ ), then
s ∈ NO(P ). In fact, assume that s 6∈ NO(P ), then there is a scenario Q, where s is
not optimal, i.e., there is s′ such that pref(Q, s) < pref(Q, s′). We want to show that
this holds also in the scenario Qs′ . If we consider the scenario Q1 obtained from Q by
putting the preference value of any tuple that is in s but not in s′ to its lower bound, then,
the preference of s decreases or remains the same, by monotonicity, and the preference
of s′ does not change. Hence, pref(Q1, s) ≤ pref(Q, s) < pref(Q, s′) = pref(Q1, s′),
and so pref(Q1, s) < pref(Q1, s′). If we consider the scenario Q2 obtained from Q1
by setting the preference value of any tuple that is in s′ but not in s to its upper bound,
then the preference of s′ increases or remains the same, by monotonicity, and the pref-
erence of s does not change. Hence, pref(Q2, s) = pref(Q1, s) < pref(Q1, s′) ≤
pref(Q2, s
′) and so pref(Q2, s) < pref(Q2, s′). If we consider the scenario obtained
from Q2 by setting the preference value of the tuples that are in s and s′ to their up-
per bound, then we have the scenario Qs′ . The preferences of the tuples that are in s
and s′ does not modify pref(Q2, s) and pref(Q2, s′). In fact, since the c-semiring is
idempotent, then pref(Q2, s) (resp., pref(Q2, s′)) is given by the tuple with the worst
preference of s (resp., s′), and, since pref(Q2, s) < pref(Q2, s′), pref(Q2, s) and
pref(Q2, s
′) must be given by different tuples, otherwise pref(Q2, s) = pref(Q2, s′).
Hence, pref(Qs
′
, s) = pref(Q2, s) < pref(Q2, s
′) = pref(Qs
′
, s). Therefore, there is
a solution s′ such s′ 6∈ Opt(Qs′). 2
The intuition behind this theorem is that, in order for a solution to be necessarily
optimal, it must be optimal also in its least favorable scenario, when the c-semiring is
strictly monotonic, and it must be optimal in the most favorable scenario of every other
solution, when the c-semiring is idempotent.
7.2 Necessarily of at least preference α solutions
By Proposition 7, we know that s ∈ Nec(P, α) if and only if α ≤ L(s). Thus, testing
whether a solution s is inNec(P, α) amounts at checking this condition that takes linear
time.
To find a solution in Nec(P, α), we know, by Proposition 7, that Nec(P, α) is not
empty only if α is at most the optimal preference of the worst scenario, and in such a
case any lower-optimal solution is in Nec(P, α). This amounts to solving one SCSP.
However, if the c-semiring is idempotent, it is sufficient to solve one CSP, as shown by
the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Given an IVSCSP P , if the c-semiring is idempotent, then Nec(P, α) co-
incides with the set of solutions of cutα(ws(P )).
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Proof: Let us denote with SL the set of the solutions of cutα(ws(P )). We first show
that Nec(P, α) ⊇ SL and then we show that Nec(P, α) ⊆ SL. Let be s a solu-
tion of P . If s ∈ SL, then, since cutα(ws(P )) is the CSP obtained from the worst
scenario of P by allowing only tuples with preference greater than or equal to α,
pref(ws(P ), s) ≥ α, by idempotence. Since ws(P ) is the worst scenario of P , then
pref(Qi, s) ≥ pref(ws(P ), s) ≥ α for every scenario Qi and so s ∈ Nec(P, α).
Therefore, Nec(P, α) ⊇ SL. If s ∈ Nec(P, α), then pref(Qi, s) ≥ α for every sce-
nario Qi and so also for the worst scenario. Hence, pref(ws(P ), s) ≥ α and so, by
definition of cutα(ws(P )), s ∈ SL. Therefore, Nec(P, α) ⊆ SL. 2
By Proposition 7, we know thatNec(P, α∗) = LO(P ). Therefore, to find a solution
in Nec(P, α∗), it is sufficient to find a solution of the worst scenario, and thus to solve
one SCSP.
7.3 Possibly optimal solutions
To find a solution in PO(P ), we can observe that LO(P ), UO(P ), LLO(P ), and
ULO(P ) are all contained in PO(P ) (Propositions 6 and 10) and they are never empty
(Propositions 5 and 9).
To test if a solution is in PO(P ), it is sufficient to test if s is optimal in one of the
two scenarios defined in the following theorem. This amounts to solving an SCSP.
Theorem 10. Given an IVSCSP P and an assignment s to the variables of P , let Qs be
the scenario where all the preferences of tuples in s are set to their upper bound and all
other tuples are associated to the lower bound of their preferences, and let Q∗ be the
scenario where all the preferences of the tuples of s are set to U(s), if U(s) is contained
in their preference interval, and to their upper bound otherwise, and all other tuples are
associated to the lower bound of their preferences. Then,
– if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, s ∈ PO(P ) ⇐⇒ s ∈ Opt(Qs);
– if the c-semiring is idempotent, s ∈ PO(P ) ⇐⇒ s ∈ Opt(Q∗).
Proof: We first show that, if s ∈ Opt(Qs), then s ∈ PO(P ). If s ∈ Opt(Qs), then s
is optimal in the scenario Qs, and so s ∈ PO(P ). We now show that, if s ∈ PO(P )
then s ∈ Opt(Qs). If s ∈ PO(P ), then there is a scenario, say Qi, where s is optimal,
that is, pref(Qi, s) ≥ pref(Qi, s′), for every other solution s′. Assume to use the same
notations used in the proof of Theorem 8. Using these notations, since pref(Qi, s) ≥
pref(Qi, s
′), for every other solution s′, then, for every other s’, λi × ui ≥ µi × ui
in the scenario Qi. This implies that, for every other s’, λi ≥ µi. In fact, if λi <
µi, then, by strict monotonicity, λi × ui < µi × ui. Since Qs is the most favorable
scenario for s, then for every scenario and so also for the scenario Qi, by monotonicity,
λ × u ≥ λ × ui ≥ λi × ui, that implies λ ≥ λi. In fact, if λ < λi, then, by strict
monotonicity, λ × ui < λi × u. Since Qs is the least favorable scenario for the tuples
in s′ but not in s, then µi ≥ µ for every scenario and so also for Qi. Hence, since
for every s′, λ ≥ λi, λi ≥ µi, and µi ≥ µ, then, by monotonicity, for every s′,
pref(Qs, s) = λ × u ≥ λi × u ≥ µi × u ≥ µ× u = pref(Qs, s′), hence s is optimal
in the scenario Qs.
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If s ∈ Opt(Q∗), then s ∈ PO(P ). We now show that, if s ∈ PO(P ), then
s ∈ Opt(Q∗). If s 6∈ Opt(Q∗), then there is a solution s′ such that pref(Q∗, s′) >
pref(Q∗, s). By construction of Q∗, by Theorem 1 and by idempotency, we have that
pref(Q∗, s) = U(s). In fact, by Theorem 1, pref(Q∗, s) ≤ U(s). Moreover, pref(Q∗, s)
6< U(s). In fact, we now show that pref(Q∗, s) is given by the combination of the pref-
erences that are all greater than or equal to U(s). By construction of Q∗ we have two
results. (1) Every tuple of s in Q∗ with preference interval that contains U(s) is as-
signed to U(s) and, by definition of U(s) and by idempotency, there must be at least
one of these preferences. (2) Every tuple with preference interval that does not contain
U(s) is assigned to its upper bound that must be a value greater than U(s), since, by
definition of U(s), the upper bound of every tuple of s must be greater than or equal
to U(s), otherwise the upper bound of s is not U(s) but a value lower than U(s),
that is a contradiction. Therefore, pref(Q∗, s) 6< U(s) and so pref(Q∗, s) = U(s).
If s and s′ have tuples in common, by construction of Q∗, pref(Q∗, s′) ≤ U(s).
In such a case, since we have shown above that pref(Q∗, s) = U(s), and since we
are assuming that there is a solution s′ such that pref(Q∗, s′) > pref(Q∗, s), then
U(s) ≥ pref(Q∗, s′) > pref(Q∗, s) = U(s), and so we have a contradiction. If s
and s′ have no tuples in common, then, for every scenario Q, pref(Q, s′) ≥ L(s′) =
pref(Q∗, s′) > pref(Q∗, s) = U(s) ≥ pref(Q, s), and so s 6∈ PO(P ). 2
In Theorem 10 we have characterized possibly optimal solutions for IVSCSPs with
idempotent c-semiring and for IVCSPs with strictly monotonic c-semiring. The char-
acterization of possibly optimal solutions for IVSCSPs with a c-semiring that is neither
idempotent nor strictly monotonic is an open question.
7.4 Possibly of at least preference α solutions
We know, by Proposition 8, that, given an IVSCSP P and an assignment s, s is in
Pos(P, α) if and only if α ≤ U(s). Thus, to test whether a solution is in Pos(P, α), it
is enough to check this condition, that takes linear time.
If the c-semiring is idempotent, to find a solution in Pos(P, α) it is sufficient to
solve one CSP, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Given an IVSCSP P over an idempotent c-semiring and an assignment
s, s ∈ Pos(P, α) iff it is a solution of cutα(bs(P )).
Proof: We first show that, if s is a solution of cutα(bs(P )), then s ∈ Pos(P, α).
If s is a solution of cutα(bs(P )), then, since cutα(bs(P )) is the CSP obtained from
the best scenario by allowing only tuples with preference greater than or equal to α,
pref(bs(P ), s) ≥ α. Hence, in the best scenario s has preference greater than or equal
to α, hence s ∈ Pos(P, α).
To conclude the proof, we show that if s ∈ Pos(P, α), then s is a solution of
cutα(bs(P )). If s ∈ Pos(P, α), then there is a scenario, say Qi, where pref(Qi, s) ≥
α. Hence, since the preference of a solution in a scenario is always lower than or equal
to its preference in the best scenario, then pref(bs(P ), s) ≥ pref(Qi, s) ≥ α, and so s
is a solution of cutα(bs(P )). 2
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By Proposition 8, we know thatPos(P, α∗) = UO(P ). Therefore, to find a solution
in Pos(P, α∗), it is sufficient to find an optimal solution of the best scenario of P , i.e.,
a solution in UO(P ), and thus to solve one SCSP.
7.5 Finding and testing optimality notions: summary of the results
We have provided algorithms to find solutions according to the various optimality no-
tions and also to test whether a given solution is optimal. In most of the cases, these
algorithms amounts to solving a soft constraint problem as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Finding and testing optimal solutions.
Optimality notion c-semiring Finding Testing
LO(P ) generic 1 SCSP 1SCSP
UO(P ) generic 1 SCSP 1SCSP
IO(P )
generic 1 SCSP 3 SCSPs
idempotent 1SCSP 1CSP
LLO(P ) strictly monotonic 1 SCSP 1 SCSP
WID(P ) idempotent 2 SCSPs + 1 CSP 2SCSPs
ID(P )
generic 2 SCSPs 2 SCSPs
idempotent 1 SCSP + 1 CSP 1 SCSP + 1 CSP
NO(P )
idempotent 2 SCSPs + 2 CSPs 2 SCSPs + 1 CSP
strictly monotonic 1 SCSP 1 SCSP
Nec(P, α)
generic 1 SCSP linear time
idempotent 1 CSP linear time
Nec(P, α∗) generic 1 SCSP linear time
PO(P )
idempotent 1 SCSP 1 SCSP
strictly monotonic 1 SCSP 1 SCSP
Pos(P, α) idempotent 1 CSP linear time
Pos(P, α∗) generic 1 SCSP linear time
8 Necessary and possible dominance
Besides finding or testing for optimality, it may sometimes be useful to know if a so-
lution dominates another one. We will consider four notions of dominance, which are
related to the general optimality notions defined above.
Definition 15 ((strictly) dominance). Given a scenario Q, a solution s strictly domi-
nates (resp., dominates) a solution s′ if and only if pref(Q, s) > pref(Q, s′) (resp.,pref(Q,
s) ≥ pref(Q, s′)) in the ordering of the considered c-semiring.
Definition 16 (necessarily (strictly) dominance). Given an IVSCSP P and two solu-
tions s and s′ of P , s necessarily strictly dominates (resp., necessarily dominates) s′ if
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and only if, in all scenarios, s strictly dominates (resp., dominates) s′. We will denote
with NDTOP (P ) (resp., NSDTOP (P )) the undominated elements in the binary re-
lation given by the necessarily dominance (resp., strictly necessarily dominance).
Definition 17 (possibly (strictly) dominance). Given an IVSCSP P and two solutions
s and s′ of P , s possibly strictly dominates (resp., possibly dominates) s′ if and only if
there is at least one scenario where s strictly dominates (resp., dominates) s′. We will
denote with with PDTOP (P ) (resp., PSDTOP (P )) the undominated elements of the
binary relation given by the possibly dominance (resp., strictly possible dominance).
In the IVSCSP P of Figure 1, s1 necessarily strictly dominates s8. In the best sce-
nario, s2 strictly dominates s4, while in the worst scenario s4 strictly dominates s2.
Thus s2 possibly strictly dominates s4, and viceversa.
Theorem 12. Consider an IVSCSP P . The following results hold:
– NO(P ) ⊆ NDTOP (P ) ⊆ NSDTOP (P ).
– NSDTOP (P ) ⊇ PO(P ).
– If the c-semiring is strictly monotonic or idempotent, thenNDTOP (P ) ⊆ PO(P ).
– If the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, NSDTOP (P ) = PO(P ).
– The sets PSDTOP (P ) and PDTOP (P ) may be empty.
– If PDTOP (P ) 6= ∅, then |PDTOP (P )| = 1.
– PDTOP (P ) ⊆ PSDTOP (P ) = NO(P ).
Proof: Let s be a solution of P .
We first show that NO(P ) ⊆ NDTOP (P ). If s 6∈ NDTOP (P ), then there a
solution s′ that necessarily dominates s, and so there is a scenario Q where s′ strictly
dominates s, that is, pref(Q, s′) > pref(Q, s). Hence, s is not optimal in that scenario
and so s 6∈ NO(P ).
We now show that NDTOP (P ) ⊆ NSDTOP (P ). If s 6∈ NSDTOP (P ), then
there is a solution s′ that necessarily strictly dominates s and so s′ necessarily dominates
s and thus s 6∈ NDTOP (P ).
We now show that PO ⊆ NSDTOP (P ). If s 6∈ NSDTOP (P ), then there is a
solution s′ that necessarily strictly dominates s, hence, for every scenario Q, s′ strictly
dominates s, that is, for every scenario Q, pref(Q, s′) > pref(Q, s), hence for every
scenario Q, s is not optimal, hence s 6∈ PO(P ).
To prove that NDTOP (P ) ⊆ PO(P ) when P is idempotent, we will show that if
s ∈ NDTOP (P ) then s is optimal in the scenario Qs, where every tuple in s is set to
its maximum preference value and all other tuples are set to their minimum preference
value. This then implies that s is possibly optimal, and hence in PO(P ), as required.
Suppose, that s ∈ NDTOP (P ) is not optimal in the scenario Qs, so there exists
some solution s′ with pref(Qs, s′) > pref(Qs, s). Since s ∈ NDTOP (P ) there
exists a scenario Q with pref(Q, s) > pref(Q, s′) or else s′ would necessarily dom-
inate s. We have pref(Qs, s′) > pref(Q, s′). Since the combination is minimum,
this means that the preference value of the worst tuple of s′ (i.e., of the worst con-
straint) is worse in Q than it is in Qs. The definition of Qs means that this tuple is
also in s′ (i.e., s and s′ agree on the scope of the worst constraint). This implies that
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pref(Q, s) ≤ pref(Q, s′), which contradicts pref(Q, s) > pref(Q, s′), completing
the proof that NDTOP (P ) ⊆ PO(P ) when P is idempotent.
If the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, NSDTOP (P ) = PO(P ). We have al-
ready shown that NSDTOP (P ) ⊇ PO(P ). We now show that NSDTOP (P ) ⊆
PO(P ). If s ∈ NSDTOP (P ), then there is no solution s′ such that for every sce-
nario Qi, pref(Qi, s′) > pref(Qi, s). Hence, for every s′, there is a scenario Qi where
pref(Qi, s
′) ≤ pref(Qi, s). By following the same reasoning done above, it is possible
to show that, ∀s′, pref(Qs, s′) ≤ pref(Qs, s). Therefore, s is optimal in Qs and so
s ∈ PO(P ).
Furthermore, if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, then we have NDTOP (P ) ⊆
PO(P ) since NDTOP (P ) ⊆ NSDTOP (P ) = PO(P ).
PSDTOP (P ) and PDTOP (P ) may be empty, because there can be cycles in
the possibly dominates and possibly strictly dominates relations. Let us consider the
solutions s2 and s4 in the running example. s2 has preference interval [0.5, 0.9] and s4
has preference interval [0.6, 0.8]. Then, s2 possibly strictly dominates (and so possibly
dominates) s4, since s2 strictly dominates s4 in the best scenario, and s4 possibly
strictly dominates (and so possibly dominates) s2, since s4 strictly dominates s2 in the
worst scenario.
If PDTOP (P ) 6= ∅, then |PDTOP (P )| = 1. In fact, assume that PDTOP (P )
contains two complete assignments s1 and s2. If s1 and s2 are in PDTOP (P ), then s1
does not possibly dominate s2 and s2 does not possibly dominate s1. Since s1 does not
possibly dominate s2, then for every scenario Q of P , pref(Q, s1) < pref(Q, s2), and,
since s2 does not possibly dominate s1, then for every scenario Q of P , pref(Q, s2) <
pref(Q, s1), that is a contradiction.
PSDTOP (P ) = NO(P ). In fact, s ∈ PSDTOP (P ) iff there is no solution s′
such that s′ possibly strictly dominates s, iff there is no solution s′ that strictly dom-
inates s, iff there is no solution s′ such that pref(Q, s′) > pref(Q, s) for some sce-
nario Q, iff for every solution s′, pref(Q, s) ≥ pref(Q, s′) for every scenario Q, iff
s ∈ NO(P ).
PDTOP (P ) ⊆ PSDTOP (P ). In fact, if s 6∈ PSDTOP (P ), then there is a
solution s′ that possibly strictly dominates s and thus s′ possibly dominates s and so
s 6∈ PDTOP (P ). 2
Summarizing, given an IVSCSP P with an idempotent or a strictly monotonic c-
semiring, we have the following inclusions, that are shown in Figure 4: PDTOP (P ) ⊆
PSDTOP (P ) = NO(P ) ⊆ NDTOP (P ) ⊆ PO(P ) ⊆ NSDTOP (P ). Moreover,
when the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, we have also NSDTOP (P ) = PO(P ).
Therefore, the set of the necessarily optimal solutions of P coincides with the set of the
undominated elements of the binary relation given by the possibly strictly dominance
over P , both if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic and if it idempotent. Moreover, the
set of the possibly optimal solutions of P coincides with the set of the undominated
elements of the binary relation given by the necessarily strictly dominance over P , if
the c-semiring is strictly monotonic.
To test if s possibly strictly dominates (resp., possibly dominates) s′ we can set each
interval associated with s but not with s′ to its upper bound; let λ be the combination
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Fig. 4. Relation between undominated elements of the binary relation given by the (strictly) nec-
essarily dominance and the undominated elements of the binary relation given by the (strictly)
possibly dominance for an IVSCSP P defined over an idempotent or a strictly monotonic c-
semiring.
of these values. Then we set each interval associated with s′ but not with s to its lower
bound; let µ be the combination of these values. Finally, we compare the preference
values of s and s′, by testing if the condition λ × u1 × · · · × uk > µ× u1 × · · · × uk
(resp., λ × u1 × · · · × uk ≥ µ × u1 × · · · × uk ) holds for any selections of values
u1, . . . , uk in the intervals of both s and s′. If we have strict monotonicity, testing this
condition amounts to testing if λ > µ (resp., λ ≥ µ). If we have idempotence, we can
replace each ui with its upper bound, and then test the condition.
To test if s necessarily dominates s′, we first check if s possibly strictly dominates
s′. Then:
– If s possibly strictly dominates s′, then there is a scenario where s strictly dominates
s′ and so s′ does not necessarily dominate s. Then, we check if s′ possibly strictly
dominates s. If so, then there is a scenario where s′ strictly dominates s, hence
s does not necessarily dominate s′. Therefore, s and s′ are incomparable w.r.t. the
necessarily dominance relation and so we conclude negatively. Otherwise, if s′ does
not possibly strictly dominates s, then, for every scenario, s dominates s′ and, since,
by hypothesis, there is a scenario where s strictly dominates s′, then s necessarily
dominates s′ and so we conclude positively.
– If s does not possibly strictly dominate s′, then, for every scenario, s′ dominates s,
i.e., for every scenario Q, pref(Q, s′) ≥ pref(Q, s). Then, we check if s′ possibly
strictly dominates s. If so, then s′ necessarily dominates s and so we conclude
negatively. Otherwise, if s′ does not possibly strictly dominates s, then, for every
scenario, s dominates s′, i.e., for every scenario Q, pref(Q, s) ≥ pref(Q, s′), and
so, since by the hypothesis above pref(Q, s′) ≥ pref(Q, s), we have that, for every
scenario Q, pref(Q, s) = pref(Q, s′), hence s does not necessarily dominates s′
and so we conclude negatively.
To test if s necessarily strictly dominates s′, we follow a reasoning similar to the
one presented above, but we consider the possibly dominance relation instead of the
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possibly strictly dominance relation. Moreover, when s does not possibly dominate s′
(i.e., the second item above), we can conclude immediately negatively, since in this case
s′ necessarily strictly dominates s.
9 Multiple intervals
One may wonder if IVSCSPs would be more expressive if we allowed not just a single
preference interval for each assignment, but a set of such intervals. For example, instead
of giving us the interval [0.1, 0.8], a user could be more precise and give us [0.1,0.5]
and [0.7,0.8]. This would reduce the uncertainty of the problem. We will now show that
all the interval-based optimality notions and all the scenario-based optimality notions
that guarantee a certain level of preference would give the same set of optimals in this
more general setting. Moreover, when the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, also the
possibly and necessary optimality notions give the same set of optimals. Also, when
the c-semiring is idempotent, the necessary optimality notions give the same set of
optimals. In the other cases, we are however able to find approximations of the possibly
and necessarily optimal solutions. More precisely, we have the following results, that
are also summarized in Table 3.
Theorem 13. Consider an IVSCSP P . Take now a new problem P ′ with the same vari-
ables, domains, and constraint topology as P , where, for each interval [l, u] in P , there
is a set of intervals [l, u1], [l2, u2], . . . , [ln, u] such that ui < li+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Then:
– X(P ) = X(P ′) for X ∈ {LO,UO, IO,LLO,ULO,WID, ID}.
– Nec(P, α) = Nec(P ′, α) for all α.
– Pos(P, α) = Pos(P ′, α) for all α.
– NO(P ′) ⊇ NO(P ).
– PO(P ′) ⊆ PO(P ).
– If the c-semiring is strictly monotonic,NO(P ) = NO(P ′) andPO(P ) = PO(P ′).
– If the c-semiring is idempotent, NO(P ) = NO(P ′).
Proof: To show thatX(P ) = X(P ′) forX ∈ {LO,UO, IO,LLO,ULO,WID, ID},
it is sufficient to recall that all solutions in {LO,UO, IO,LLO,ULO,WID, ID} are
computed by considering for every tuple associated with interval [l, u] only the lower
bound l and the upper bound u that, by construction of P ′, are the same in P and P ′.
Let s be a complete assignment of P . Let us consider a generic α. To show that
Nec(P, α) = Nec(P ′, α), we first show that Nec(P, α) ⊆ Nec(P ′, α). If s ∈ Nec(P,
α), then, for every scenario Q of P , pref(Q, s) ≥ α. Since the set of the scenarios of P
is a superset of the scenarios of P ′, this holds also for every scenarios of P ′. Therefore,
s ∈ Nec(P ′, α). We now show that Nec(P ′, α) ⊆ Nec(P, α). If s 6∈ Nec(P, α), then
pref(Q, s) < α for some scenario Q of P and this holds also for the worst scenario,
since pref(ws(P ), s) ≤ pref(Q, s) < α. Since the worst scenario is one of the scenario
of P ′, then s 6∈ Nec(P ′, α).
To show thatPos(P, α) = Pos(P ′, α), we first show thatPos(P ′, α) ⊆ Pos(P, α).
If s ∈ Pos(P ′, α), then for some scenario Q of P ′, pref(Q, s) ≥ α. Since ev-
ery scenario of P ′ is also a scenario of P , then s ∈ Pos(P, α). We now show that
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Pos(P, α) ⊆ Pos(P ′, α). If s ∈ Pos(P, α), then pref(Q, s) ≥ α for some scenario Q
of P , and this holds also for the best scenario, since pref(bs(P ), s) ≥ pref(Q, s) ≥ α.
Since the best scenario is one of the scenarios of P ′, then s ∈ Pos(P ′, α).
Since the set of the scenarios ofP is a superset of the scenarios ofP ′, thenNO(P ) ⊆
NO(P ′). In fact, if s ∈ NO(P ), then it is optimal for every scenario of P and also for
every scenario of P ′.
Moreover, PO(P ′) ⊆ PO(P ). In fact, if s ∈ PO(P ′), then there is a scenario
of P ′ where s is optimal and, as every scenario of P ′ is also a scenario of P , then
s ∈ PO(P ).
If the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, thenNO(P ) = NO(P ′). By Theorem 8, we
know that, if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, then s ∈ NO(P ) iff s ∈ Opt(Qs),
where Qs is the scenario where every preference associated to a tuple of s is set to
its lower bound and the preferences of all other tuples are set to their upper bound.
Since Qs is one of the scenarios of P ′, it is possible to show that s ∈ NO(P ′) iff
s ∈ Opt(Qs), by following the same proof of Theorem 8. Hence, NO(P ′) = NO(P ).
Similarly, if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, then PO(P ) = PO(P ′). By The-
orem 10, we know that, if the c-semiring is strictly monotonic, then s ∈ PO(P ) iff
s ∈ Opt(Qs), where Qs is the scenario where all the preferences of tuples in s are
set to their upper bound and all other tuples are associated to their lower bound. Since
Qs is one of the scenarios of P ′, it is possible to show, by following the same proof of
Theorem 10, that s ∈ PO(P ) iff s ∈ Opt(Qs).
If the c-semiring is idempotent, NO(P ) = NO(P ′). In fact, by Theorem 8, we
know that s ∈ NO(P ) iff for every s′, s ∈ Opt(Qs′ ), where Qs′ is the scenario
where we put every tuple of s′ to its upper bound and every other tuple to its lower
bound. Since, for every s′, Qs′ is a scenario of P ′, then by following the same proof
of Theorem 8, we can show that s ∈ NO(P ′) iff for every s′, s ∈ Opt(Qs′), Hence,
NO(P ′) = NO(P ). 2
Table 3. Comparison of the optimality sets of problems P (with single intervals) and P ′ (with
multiple intervals), as defined in Theorem 13.
Optimality notion c-semiring Comparison
LO generic LO(P ) = LO(P ′)
UO generic UO(P ) = UO(P ′)
IO generic IO(P ) = IO(P ′)
LLO generic LLO(P ) = LLO(P ′)
ULO generic ULO(P ) = ULO(P ′)
Nec(α) generic Nec(P, α) = Nec(P ′, α)
Pos(α) generic Pos(P, α) = Pos(P ′, α)
NO
generic NO(P ) ⊆ NO(P ′)
idempotent NO(P ) = NO(P ′)
strictly monotonic NO(P ) = NO(P ′)
PO
generic PO(P ) ⊇ PO(P ′)
strictly monotonic PO(P ) = PO(P ′)
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10 Experimental results
10.1 Instance generator
We randomly generated fuzzy IVMSPs (as defined in Section 5.7) according to the
following parameters:
– m: number of meetings (default 12);
– n: number of agents (default 5);
– k: number of meetings per agent (default 3);
– l: number of time slots (default 10);
– min and max: minimal (default 1) and maximal (default 2) distance (in time slots)
between two locations;
– i: percentage of preference intervals (default 30%).
Given such parameters, we generate an IVSCSP with m variables, representing the
meetings, each with domain of size l. The domain values 1, . . . , l represent the time
slots, that are assumed to all have the same length equal to one time unit, and to be
adjacent to each other. Thus, for example, time slot i ends when time slot i + 1 starts.
Given two time slots i and j > i, they can be used for two meetings only if the distance
between their locations (see later) is at most j − i− 1.
For each of the n agents, we generate randomly k integers between 1 and m, rep-
resenting the meetings he needs to participate in. Also, for each pair of time slots, we
randomly generate a integer between min and max that represents the time needed to
go from one location to the other one. This will be called the distance table.
Given two meetings, if there is at least one agent who needs to participate in both,
we generate a binary constraint between the corresponding variables. Such a constraint
is satisfied by all pairs of time slots that are compatible according to the distance table.
We then generate the preferences over the domain values and the compatible pairs
in the binary constraints, by randomly generating a number in (0, 1] or an interval over
(0, 1], according to the parameter i.
As an example, assume to have m = 5, n = 3, k = 2, l = 5, min = 1, max = 2,
and i = 30. According to these parameters, we generate a IVMSP with the following
features:
– 5 meetings: m1, m2, m3, m4, and m5;
– 3 agents: a1, a2, and a3;
– 5 time slots: t1, . . . , t5;
– agents’ participation to meetings: we randomly generate 2 meetings for each agent,
for example
• a1 must participate in meetings m1 and m2;
• a2 must participate in meetings m4 and m5;
• a3 must participate in meetings m2 and m3;
– distance table: we randomly generate its values, for example as in Table 4;
– we randomly generate the preferences associated to domain values and compatible
pairs in the constraints, in a way that 30% of the preferences are preference intervals
contained in (0, 1] and 70% of the preferences are single values in (0, 1].
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Table 4. Distance between meeting locations.
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 1 2 1 2
2 1 0 2 1 2
3 2 2 0 1 1
4 1 1 1 0 2
5 2 2 1 2 0
In this example, a feasible meeting scheduling is obtained by assigning the follow-
ing time slots to meetings: (m1, t3), (m2, t1), (m3, t5), (m4, t2), (m5, t5). The prefer-
ence interval for such a scheduling will depend on the preference values in the domains
and constraints. More precisely, as we use preference values between 0 and 1 and we
adopt the fuzzy criteria, the preference interval will be [l, u], where l (resp., u) is the
minimum among all the lower (resp., upper) bounds of the preference intervals selected
by this assignment in the constraints.
10.2 Experimental tests
We implemented our algorithms using a Java (version 1.6.0 07) c-semiring based frame-
work and the Choco constraint programming toolkit (version 1.2.06). Experiments were
run on AMD Opteron 2.3GHz machines with 2GB of RAM.
We used 4 different test sets, each one generated varying in turn n, m, k, and i,
while fixing the others to their default values. Moreover, α, i.e., the minimum level of
preference used in Pos(P, α) and Nec(P, α), is always 0.5.2 The sample size is 50 for
each data point.
Figure 5(a) shows the execution time (measured in milliseconds) of the algorithms
to find a solution, belonging to each type of the interval-based optimality notions, as a
function of the number of agents. We can notice that there is a peak when the number
of agents is 8, which represents problems with a small number of solutions. With more
agents, the problems have no solution, while with a smaller number of agents there are
many solutions. In both such cases, it is easy to find a feasible meeting scheduling.
For the more general optimality notions, Figure 5(b) shows that the behavior is the
same except for POS(0.5) and NEC(0.5) because, in these algorithms, we need to solve
a CSP, while in the other algorithms we solve at least one SCSP. In fact, POS(0.5) and
NEC(0.5) takes approximately the same time no matter the number of agents in the
problem.
Figures 5(c) and 5(d) show the performance of the algorithms for all optimality no-
tions, as a function of the number of meetings per agent. Since LO(P ) = Nec(P, α∗)
and UO(P ) = Pos(P, α∗), these curves in the two graphs coincide. The lines corre-
sponding to the WID algorithm in Figure 5(c) and to the NO algorithm in Figure 5(d)
are similar, and are above the others in both figures, because the WID algorithm needs
to find the lower and upper optimal preference, to perform two cuts, and to solve the
2 In the following figures, we will omit writing P in the names of the algorithms.
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Fig. 5. Execution time (msec.) as a function of number of agents and meetings per agent.
CSP obtained combining the cuts, while the other algorithms (expect NO) only need to
solve an SCSP. Moreover, the WID algorithm is a sub-routine of the NO algorithm.
Notice that finding solutions in NO, Nec(P, α∗), or POS(P, α∗) is more expensive
than finding solutions in Nec(P, 0.5), or POS(P, 0.5), as expected since α∗ and α∗ are
the best preference levels that one can reach.
The peak at 4 meetings per agents, shown in Figures 5(c) and 5(d), corresponds to
problems which are more difficult to solve because they have very few solutions. This
is analogous to what we have noticed in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) with the peak at 8 agents.
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show that the execution time increases exponentially when the
number of meetings (i.e., the number of variables in the problem) arises. In this case,
the execution time is mainly influenced by the size of the problems, no matter which
algorithm is used.
Figures 6(c) and 6(d) show that the execution time is not influenced by the amount
of intervals in the problem. As in all the other graphs, finding a WID or an NO solution
is more expensive than finding other kinds of solutions. The two peaks at 20% and 60%
of intervals are due to two very hard problems inside the test set.
Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) consider those optimality sets that can be empty (that
is, WID, ID, and NO) and show the percentage of times a solution of a certain kind
exists. Clearly, when there is no solution, WID, ID and NO contain all assignments
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Fig. 6. Execution time (msec.) as a function of the number of meetings and the percentage of
intervals.
and coincide. This is the case when the number of meetings per agents is larger (more
than 3 meetings per agent in our settings). When we consider less constrained problems
with 2-3 meetings per agent, as expected, we have more WID solutions than ID and NO
solutions. Notice that the size of WID, ID and NO varies very little when the number
of agents is between 4 and 8 (Figure 7(b)). However, when such a number is between
8 to 10, the size of the solution sets is larger because there are more instances with no
solution. If we vary the number of meetings, we can see in Figure 8(a) that the number
of such a kind of solutions tends to decrease slightly as the number of variables (i.e.
meetings) arises. In fact, a larger number of variables may imply a larger number of
constraints, which may imply a smaller number of WID, ID, and NO solutions.
In figure 8(b) we consider instances where we vary the percentage of intervals from
10 to 100%. When incompleteness is higher than 40%, most of the instances don’t have
WID, ID, and NO solutions. This is predictable, because a larger number of intervals
makes it less probable the existence of solutions that are optimal in all scenarios, since
the number of scenarios is larger.
11 Final considerations and future work
Summarizing, given an IVSCSP P , the solutions in NO(P ) are certainly the most
attractive, as they are the best ones in every scenario. However, if there is none, we
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Fig. 7. Existence of WID, ID, and NO solution, varying agents and meetings per agent.
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Fig. 8. Existence of WID, ID, and NO solution, varying meetings and intervals.
can look for solutions in Nec(P, α∗) (which coincide with solutions in LO(P )), which
guarantee a preference level α∗ in all scenarios. If α∗ is too low, we can consider other
notions of optimality; for example, if we feel optimistic, we can consider the solutions in
Pos(P, α∗)(which coincide with solutions in UO(P )): they guarantee that it is possible
to reach a higher level of preference, although not in all scenarios.
If we allow users to associate to each partial assignment in the constraints not just
a single interval, but a set of multiple intervals, this would reduce the uncertainty of
the problem. However, when the c-semiring is strictly monotonic (resp., idempotent),
this added generality does not change the set of the optimal solutions in any of the
considered notions (resp., in any of the considered notions with the exception of the
possibly optimal notions). This means that a level of precision greater than a single
interval does not add useful information when looking for an optimal solution.
This paper considers only totally ordered preferences. IVSCSPs can be defined also
for a partially ordered setting. We plan to extend the analysis of the optimality notions
also to this more general case. We also intend to define dedicated solving or propagat-
ing schemes to tackle IVSCSPs rather than relying on existing solvers for SCSPs. It
37
is interesting also to consider the addition of probability distributions over preference
intervals and to interleave search with elicitation as in [6, 7].
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